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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 4 actorsExploits 1 CVE

ASPXSpy

Also known asASPXTool

ASPXSpy is an ASPX web shell, also referred to as ASPXTool in some reporting, that has been deployed on accessible Microsoft IIS servers and other public-facing web infrastructure after server compromise. It is used to provide follow-on command execution, including via cmd.exe, and has been observed alongside other web shells such as China Chopper, ANTAK, reGeorg, devilzshell, and Caterpillar.

The content associates ASPXSpy with multiple threat actors and intrusion sets. Lebanese Cedar deployed ASPXSpy after compromising victim web servers through n-day vulnerabilities. Agrius used ASPXSpy web shells, including unique and base64-encoded variants, after exploiting public-facing applications; in some cases the actors hid ASPXSPY inside files labeled as "Certificate" text files. Agrius used it for command execution, tunneling RDP through deployed web shells, and as part of broader intrusions involving reconnaissance, lateral movement, credential theft, data staging, exfiltration, and subsequent wiping activity. APT39 used ASPXSpy and ANTAK after exploiting vulnerable web servers and also used stolen credentials against OWA. BRONZE UNION used a variant of ASPXSpy together with tools such as Sysupdate, PlugX, HttpBrowser, China Chopper, and OwaAuth. Threat Group-3390 used the ASPXTool version on IIS servers. HAFNIUM and Gelsemium-linked activity also included ASPXSpy web shells.

Observed infection vectors and deployment contexts in the content include exploitation of public-facing web servers, exploitation of n-day vulnerabilities, and compromise of vulnerable IIS/OWA infrastructure. In one Southeast Asian government intrusion cluster, attackers installed multiple web shells including ASPXSpy on a compromised web server and used them in support of intelligence collection from sensitive IIS servers.

High-confidence behavioral details directly mentioned in the content are that ASPXSpy is a web shell used for persistence/access on compromised servers and for remote command execution. The content does not provide a standalone malware-specific IOC set such as hashes or domains for ASPXSpy itself.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2021-34473ProxyShell Autodiscover SSRF in Microsoft Exchange Server

Although it is not difficult to use other off-the-shelf web-shells with different extensions such as ‘ .asmx ’ or ‘ .svc ’ to use XML or JSON in the body, it would be more fun to use our old-fashion ASPX web shells such as ASPXSpy.

via mdsecmdsec.co.uk
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Volatile Cedar

Initial access methods best observed have been centered around the compromise of victim web servers via n-day vulnerabilities for the deployment of webshells, including ASPXSpy, devilzshell, and Caterpillar.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Mustang Panda

As in previous attacks, the threat actors gained entry via public-facing web servers and the deployment of “unique variants of ASPXSPY” — a malicious script they hid inside “Certificate” text files.

via the record mediatherecord.media
Threat Group-3390

BRONZE UNION maintains a high degree of operational flexibility... using tools such as Sysupdate, PlugX, HttpBrowser and webshells including China Chopper, OwaAuth and a variant of ASPXSpy.

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
APT39

...install web shells, such as ANTAK and ASPXSPY...

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

The Agrius threat group utilizes VPN services (primarily ProtonVPN) for anonymization when accessing the public facing applications of its targets. Upon successful exploitation, the threat actor deploys webshells...

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence7

Upon successful exploitation, the threat actor deploys webshells... The webshells Agrius deploys are mostly variations of ASPXSpy.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

a malicious script they hid inside “Certificate” text files

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence2

Agrius uses those webshells to tunnel RDP traffic in order to leverage compromised accounts to move laterally.

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Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.