DCSyncer.Slick
DCSyncer.Slick is a Windows post-exploitation utility used by the Iran-linked espionage actor UNC1549, also tracked as Nimbus Manticore and Subtle Snail, and described in broader reporting as part of the Tortoiseshell toolset. It is used to conduct DCSync-style attacks against Active Directory in order to extract NTLM password hashes directly from domain controllers, supporting privilege escalation and credential access objectives. Reporting describes it as a Windows utility based on DCSyncer that mimics the legitimate Active Directory replication feature. DCSyncer.Slick has been observed in intrusions targeting aerospace, aviation, and defense organizations across the Middle East, and related reporting also links the broader actor to telecommunications targeting. UNC1549 commonly gains initial access through spear-phishing, stolen credentials, abuse of third-party relationships, and access to remote platforms such as Azure Virtual Desktop, Citrix, and VMware. After compromise, the actor deploys DCSyncer.Slick alongside other custom malware and utilities including MINIBIKE, TWOSTROKE, DEEPROOT, LIGHTRAIL, GHOSTLINE, POLLBLEND, CRASHPAD, SIGHTGRAB, and TRUSTTRAP. Mandiant reported that UNC1549 abused DLL search order hijacking to execute DCSyncer.Slick and other payloads, often by masquerading malicious components as legitimate software from vendors such as FortiGate, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Citrix, and VMware, and in some cases installing legitimate software to facilitate the hijack. High-confidence capability information directly stated in the source is that DCSyncer.Slick extracts NTLM password hashes from domain controllers and is used for DCSync attacks for privilege escalation.
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Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Over subsequent years, the group layered in additional tooling — MiniJunk, MiniBrowse, DCSyncer.Slick, DeepRoot, GhostLine, LightRail, and others...
"DCSYNCER.SLICK, a Windows utility based on DCSyncer to conduct DCSync attacks for privilege escalation"
Techniques & procedures
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique"UNC1549 abused DLL search order hijacking to execute CRASHPAD, DCSYNCER.SLICK, GHOSTLINE, LIGHTRAIL, MINIBIKE, POLLBLEND, SIGHTGRAB, and TWOSTROKE payloads... installed the legitimate software after initial access in order to abuse SOH... replaced or added the malicious DLLs within the legitimate installation directory, typically with SYSTEM privileges."
Stealth
1 technique"UNC1549 abused DLL search order hijacking to execute CRASHPAD, DCSYNCER.SLICK, GHOSTLINE, LIGHTRAIL, MINIBIKE, POLLBLEND, SIGHTGRAB, and TWOSTROKE payloads... installed the legitimate software after initial access in order to abuse SOH... replaced or added the malicious DLLs within the legitimate installation directory, typically with SYSTEM privileges."
Credential Access
2 techniquesincluding Kerberoasting, DCSync operations, RDP hijacking, and internal spear phishing
including Kerberoasting, DCSync operations, RDP hijacking, and internal spear phishing
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Tool in Tortoiseshell’s framework associated with credential theft and long-term persistent access.
Windows utility used during intrusions (specific function not described in the provided content).
Windows utility derived from DCSyncer used to perform DCSync-style credential replication attacks to obtain elevated access.
Credential-dumping tool that abuses/mimics Active Directory DCSync replication behavior to extract NTLM password hashes from domain controllers.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.