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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

Metamorfo

Casbaneiro, also referred to in the provided content as Metamorfo, is a Latin American banking trojan family and part of the broader Brazilian/LATAM banker ecosystem alongside families such as Grandoreiro, Mekotio, Guildma, Mispadu, Amavaldo, Vadokrist, and others. ESET identified Casbaneiro as one of at least 11 distinct and concurrently active LATAM banking trojan families and assessed that these families likely share TTPs and implementation details. Casbaneiro is associated with financially motivated campaigns focused on stealing banking and other financial credentials, including campaigns targeting users in Mexico, and the ecosystem has also expanded beyond Latin America into Spain and Portugal.

The malware has been delivered through phishing and spam-driven infection chains, including emails with malicious HTML attachments and social-engineering lures that require user interaction. One cited campaign impersonated the UK Courts & Tribunals Service with a fake employment termination document; victims who clicked through to a spoofed Microsoft-branded site on Windows triggered download of the Casbaneiro banking trojan. The content also notes that typical LATAM banker distribution chains used spammed links, malicious attachments, malvertising, and Office documents with malicious macros, often involving ZIP archives, MSI installers, JavaScript, VBScript, PowerShell, AutoIt, batch scripts, and DLL side-loading. Casbaneiro was specifically noted as using payloads written in JavaScript, and the broader family set commonly shifted from LNK-based delivery to MSI packages in 2019.

Behaviorally, the malware collects victim information including the username from the compromised machine and can automatically gather mouse clicks, continuous screenshots, clipboard contents, and website browsing data using timers. It can send collected data to command-and-control infrastructure. The content also attributes clipboard hijacking capability to Metamorfo/Casbaneiro, specifically monitoring clipboard contents and replacing cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones. In the broader LATAM banker model described by ESET, these trojans also monitor active window titles and trigger institution-specific fake pop-up windows to solicit sensitive information.

Casbaneiro includes multiple defense-evasion and anti-analysis features. It has hidden its GUI using the ShowWindow API, embedded a vmdetect.exe executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution, and contains functionality to kill processes associated with defenses and prevent certain processes from launching. The content also states that executables associated with Metamorfo were digitally signed using AVAST Software certificates. For cleanup or anti-forensics, it has a command to delete the Registry key \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.

For communications, Metamorfo/Casbaneiro command-and-control traffic has been encrypted using OpenSSL, and the malware can exfiltrate collected information to its C2 server. ESET also noted technical overlap between Casbaneiro and other LATAM banker families: Casbaneiro was among the families using communication protocols based on the Delphi Remote Access PC component; it shared a custom string-encryption scheme with several other families; it contained identical code with Vadokrist for creating and managing a string table; and it was assessed as one of the most interlinked families, especially with Mekotio and Vadokrist. The content further notes that a custom stream cipher observed elsewhere was similar to those seen in both Casbaneiro and the Amavaldo injector.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Brazilian threat actors

Related: Bank Trojan 'Casbaneiro' Worms Through Latin America

via dark readingdarkreading.com
Water Saci

The point of all this is to drop Casbaneiro, a classic banking Trojan that triggers when victims visit their cryptocurrency or financial service providers online.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
Augmented Marauder

The point of all this is to drop Casbaneiro, a classic banking Trojan that triggers when victims visit their cryptocurrency or financial service providers online.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Clicking through loads a spoofed website with the Microsoft logo designed to persuade the victim into opening it on a Windows device. It triggers a download of the Casbaneiro (aka Metamorfo) banking trojan.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

At their simplest, job termination scams are a type of phishing attack designed to trick you into handing over your personal and financial information, or on clicking on a malicious link which could trigger a malware download.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The end goal is to persuade you to click on a malicious link or open an attachment, perhaps by claiming that it includes details of severance payments and termination dates.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell. APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

DarkHydrus has sent malware that required users to hit the enable button in Microsoft Excel to allow an .iqy file to be downloaded... TA505 has used lures to get users to enable content in malicious attachments and execute malicious files contained in archives.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder. | Multiple entries describe creating .lnk shortcuts in Startup folders, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory and DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder. | Multiple entries describe creating .lnk shortcuts in Startup folders, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory and DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

An email impersonating the UK’s Courts & Tribunals Service... Clicking through loads a spoofed website with the Microsoft logo designed to persuade the victim into opening it on a Windows device.

T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence1

Bad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

APT5 has used the THINBLOOD utility to clear SSL VPN log files located at /home/runtime/logs.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1070.009Clear PersistenceEvidence1

CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Agent Tesla has used ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden to hide windows. APT19 used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden. APT28 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.

Collection

4 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine... RTM monitors browsing activity and automatically captures screenshots if a victim browses to a URL matching one of a list of strings.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine, and set timers to collect the contents of the clipboard and website browsing.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information... AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

A significant amount of observed campaigns focus on stealing credentials for banking or other financial accounts, including use of banking trojans such as METAMORFO aka "Horabot," BBtok, and JanelaRAT.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
7 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
7 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching18

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping32

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.