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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

StreamSpy

StreamSpy is a trojan/backdoor associated with the Indian-origin threat actor Patchwork, also tracked as Dropping Elephant and APT-Q-36, and described in reporting as used in espionage operations, including targeting Pakistan's defense sector. It has been reported as a previously undocumented malware family as of December 2025. StreamSpy uses WebSocket and HTTP for command-and-control communications, with reporting specifically noting that C2 commands were concealed within WebSocket traffic for stealth. Reported delivery includes ZIP archives hosted on firebasescloudemail[.]com. Its documented capabilities include harvesting system information, establishing persistence, executing commands, downloading files, uploading files, enumerating the file system, manipulating files, and executing both cmd and PowerShell commands. Persistence mechanisms mentioned in the supporting content include Windows Registry, scheduled tasks, or LNK files in the Startup folder. The activity is linked to Patchwork through reporting and malware/tooling similarities noted with Spyder, a variant of WarHawk attributed to SideWinder, and shared digital-signature correlations with ShadowAgent, a RAT attributed to the DoNot Team; QiAnXin also reported resource sharing between Patchwork and DoNot. High-confidence infrastructure detail directly mentioned in the content includes distribution via firebasescloudemail[.]com.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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patchwork_apt

Patchwork APT Deploys StreamSpy Trojan, Hiding C2 Commands in WebSocket Traffic for Stealth Espionage

via security online infosecurityonline.info
Maha Grass

"...we have named this Trojan StreamSpy."

via ctoatncsc substackctoatncsc.substack.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

“ShadowAgent… communicates with the server using WebSocket and HTTP” and “StreamSpy… communicates… using a combination of WebSocket and HTTP… retrieves commands… through this WebSocket channel. HTTP is used for… file transfers.”

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.