GravityRAT
GravityRAT is a spyware/RAT family active since at least 2015 and believed to be linked to Pakistani threat actors. Reporting cited in the content states Cisco Talos published research on it in 2018 and that CERT-IN first discovered the Trojan in 2017; it was used to target the Indian armed forces and more broadly employees of Indian defense, police, and related organizations. The malware was initially associated with Windows, then expanded to Android in 2018 and later to macOS. Delivery described in the content includes trojanized or fake applications such as Travel Mate Pro, Enigma, Titanium, WeShare, TrustX, Click2Chat, Bollywood, Sharify, MelodyMate, GoZap, StrongBox, TeraSpace, OrangeVault, CvStyler, and SavitaBhabi, with victims reportedly lured via fake Facebook accounts.
Capabilities directly described in the content include collecting the victim username and account details such as account type, description, full name, SID, and status; gathering host information via WMI including Win32_Processor data such as processor ID, name, manufacturer, and clock speed; obtaining system date and time; collecting the victim IP address, MAC address, and account domain name; listing running processes; listing available services; using netstat to identify open ports; executing commands remotely on the infected host; and stealing files with extensions including .docx, .doc, .pptx, .ppt, .xlsx, .xls, .rtf, and .pdf. One described behavior is stealing files based on an extension list when a USB drive is connected. Persistence on Windows is achieved by creating a scheduled task to re-execute daily; a macOS Enigma variant established persistence with a cron job.
Android-related activity in the content states that the trojanized Travel Mate Pro exfiltrated device data, contact lists, email addresses, call logs, SMS logs, and files from device and removable storage, including .jpg, .jpeg, .log, .png, .txt, .pdf, .xml, .doc, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .docx, and .opus files. A Windows-related sample, ZW.exe, is described as collecting system information, searching for documents, listing running processes, intercepting keystrokes, taking screenshots, executing shell commands, and scanning ports.
Infrastructure and IoCs explicitly mentioned in the content include HTTP C2 over non-standard TCP port 46769 and related use of port 64443; domains n1.nortonupdates[.]online and n2.nortonupdates[.]online, which resolved to 213.152.161[.]219; n3.nortonupdates[.]online:64443; enigma.net[.]in; titaniumx.co[.]in; windowsupdates[.]eu; mozillaupdates[.]com; mozillaupdates[.]us; u01.msoftserver[.]eu; and msoftserver[.]eu:64443 with path /ZULU_SERVER.php. Additional sample and payload names mentioned include Enigma.ps1, enigma.exe, Xray.exe, ZW.exe, RW.exe, TW.exe, Whisper, Wpd.exe, Taskhostex.exe, WCNsvc.exe, SMTPHost.exe, and CSRP.exe. The content also notes RW.exe used C2 path /ROMEO/5d907853.php and TW.exe used /TANGO/e252a516.php, and that older Whisper variants contained the strings "lolomycin2017" and "lolomycin&Co."
Hunt this family in your stack
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Techniques & procedures
28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Discovery
10 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.
The spyware receives commands from the server, including to: ... scan ports
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
Examples include 'TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host' and multiple entries checking whether the current user is an administrator or has elevated privileges.
Examples include 'Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host,' 'Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information,' and 'Volt Typhoon has leveraged WMIC for execution, remote system discovery.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
Examples include 'Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of user accounts from a victim's machine,' 'DRATzarus can obtain a list of users from an infected machine,' 'Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames from an infected machine,' and 'TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host.'
Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").
Collection
5 techniques
Collection
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.
AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices. APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices. BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.
The spyware receives commands from the server, including to: ... intercept keystrokes
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."
IOCs tracked for this family
76 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
34 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Multi-platform remote access trojan enabling persistent access to compromised devices and exfiltration/harvesting of sensitive data (e.g., documents, photos, encrypted backups), using stealth and disguising tactics.
GravityRAT is a cross-platform remote access trojan capable of data theft, including WhatsApp backups, and features advanced anti-analysis and evasion techniques. It is attributed to the Pakistan-based Transparent Tribe group.
GravityRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) known for espionage activities across multiple platforms, enabling threat actors to exfiltrate sensitive data and maintain persistent access.
GravityRAT is a cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT) that targets Windows, Android, and macOS systems. It masquerades as legitimate software to infect devices, collects sensitive data, and exfiltrates it to remote servers. It employs advanced evasion techniques, including environmental checks and CPU temperature readings, to avoid detection and analysis.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.