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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

GoldMax

Also known asSUNSHUTTLE

GoldMax, also known as SUNSHUTTLE, is a second-stage command-and-control backdoor written in Go, with Windows and Linux variants. It is associated with NOBELIUM/APT29/Cozy Bear/The Dukes, the SVR-linked threat actor tied to the SolarWinds supply-chain intrusion. Microsoft reported GoldMax as part of NOBELIUM’s late-stage post-compromise tooling observed primarily from August to September 2020, possibly as early as June 2020, after initial access via compromised credentials or the trojanized SolarWinds Orion binary and follow-on activity involving TEARDROP.

GoldMax functions as a backdoor that can execute OS commands, spawn a shell, download and execute files, upload/exfiltrate files over the existing C2 channel, and receive configuration updates from C2. It persists via scheduled tasks, including tasks impersonating systems management software, and has used filenames matching the system name while residing in ProgramData subfolders made to resemble legitimate software locations. It can check the compromised system’s current date and time against a hardcoded execution trigger or activation date and can send the current timestamp to the C2 server.

For stealth and evasion, GoldMax has been packed for obfuscation, stores encrypted configuration data on disk in .tmp files, and can dynamically update configuration values such as activation date, C2 URL, User-Agent, decoy-traffic settings, and PRNG range. Microsoft reported the configuration is encrypted with AES-256 in CFB mode and Base64-encoded with a custom alphabet. GoldMax also uses decoy HTTP GET traffic around malicious communications to blend with legitimate web activity, including pseudo-random Referer values from common domains. Its communications with C2 are RSA-encrypted; Microsoft further described session establishment using HTTP requests with custom Cookie values, RSA-OAEP decryption of a session key using an embedded RSA private key, and an expected hardcoded shared-secret acknowledgement in an HTTP 200 response. GoldMax C2 infrastructure has used high-reputation or aged domains, including compromised domains and domains obtained through resellers.

Additional reported characteristics include a hardcoded MAC-address check for c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a that causes termination if present, and observed Go 1.14.2 compilation with build paths such as /var/www/html/builds/ and /var/www/html/go/src/. GoldMax is explicitly referenced in CISA malware analysis reporting for SUNSHUTTLE and in Microsoft reporting on GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot as part of NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include the alias SUNSHUTTLE, the MAC address c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a, example encrypted config filename features.dat.tmp, and the plaintext log/behavioral artifacts around scheduled-task persistence and ProgramData masquerading.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

Their toolkit includes 7-Zip, AdFind, ATI-Agent, AtNow, BEATDROP, BloodHound, CEELOADER, CloudDuke, Cobalt Strike, CosmicDuke, CozyDuke, Danfuan, EnvyScout, FatDuke, FoggyWeb, GeminiDuke, Geppei, GoldFinder, GoldMax...

via cyble blogcyble.com
DarkHalo

We exposed similarities between DarkHalo’s SunShuttle backdoor and the Tomiris implant.

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence3

SVR cyber threat actors were responsible for the SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise and the associated campaign that affected U.S. government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

"It is distributed through a wide-scale malicious email campaign operated by NOBELIUM"

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

“On May 25, 2021, the campaign escalated as NOBELIUM leveraged the legitimate mass-mailing service, Constant Contact, to masquerade as a US-based development organization and distribute malicious URLs…”

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

GoldMax backdoor executable... Hides in hidden directories. Persistence via cron job on Linux.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

Many entries explicitly state malware 'can create a reverse shell' or 'launch a remote shell,' including 4H RAT, AuditCred, BLACKCOFFEE, Carbanak, DarkComet, Exaramel for Windows, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and ZxShell. | The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.'

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... System Services: Service Execution [T1569.002]

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

GoldMax backdoor executable... Hides in hidden directories. Persistence via cron job on Linux.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service [T1543.003]

T1053.003CronEvidence1

GoldMax backdoor executable... Hides in hidden directories. Persistence via cron job on Linux.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service [T1543.003]

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1
TacticStealth

"Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz"; "APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium"; "Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection."

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2
TacticStealth

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1
TacticStealth

RedCurl mimicked legitimate file names and scheduled tasks, e.g. MicrosoftCurrentupdatesCheck and MdMMaintenenceTask to mask malicious files and scheduled tasks.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
TacticStealth
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Lateral movement via the “credential hopping” technique, which includes browser cookie theft to bypass multifactor authentication (MFA) on privileged cloud accounts.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

SVR cyber actors have used a range of initial exploitation techniques... coupled with stealthy intrusion tradecraft within compromised networks... Lateral movement via the “credential hopping” technique...

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Examples include 'AppleJeus's COLDCAT C2 leverages cookie headers to contain data over HTTPS,' 'ChChes ... embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header,' 'GoldMax ... used custom HTTP cookies for C2,' and 'UPPERCUT ... sending error codes in Cookie headers.'

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Command and Control T1071: Application Layer Protocol .001: Web Protocols .004: DNS

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105]

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence2

Multiple malware families and intrusion sets are described as encrypting C2 traffic using SSL/TLS/HTTPS (e.g., "used HTTPS for command and control", "encrypts C2 communications with TLS", "uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications", "TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2"). | Examples include: "encrypts some C2 with RSA", "RSA encryption for C2 communications", "hard-coded RSA public key", "RSA-2048", "RSA-4096", and "REvil has encrypted C2 communications with the ECIES algorithm".

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

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Threat actor attribution2

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Exploited vulnerabilities

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Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping27

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.