Tarrask
Tarrask is a Windows defense-evasion and persistence malware/tool identified by Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) and linked to the China-linked HAFNIUM threat actor. It maintains persistence by creating scheduled tasks and then hiding them from normal administrative visibility. Specifically, Tarrask creates task-related registry entries under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree<TASK_NAME> and HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks{GUID}, then deletes the Security Descriptor (SD) value from the TaskCache\Tree path. Removing the SD value causes the scheduled task to disappear from Windows Task Scheduler and the schtasks utility, while remaining detectable through manual registry inspection. In observed activity, a scheduled task named "WinUpdate" was created to re-establish dropped command-and-control connections. The malware has masqueraded as executable names including winupdate.exe, date.exe, and win.exe. MSTIC also reported Tarrask leverages token theft to obtain lsass.exe security permissions so the SD value can be deleted in the SYSTEM context. Reported HAFNIUM targeting associated with Tarrask included organizations in the telecommunications, internet service provider, and data services sectors, and Microsoft noted the actor had previously used exploitation of internet-facing and zero-day vulnerabilities, web shells, and other malware in broader operations.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) highlighted the simplicity of the technique employed by the Tarrask malware that creates “hidden” scheduled tasks on the system to maintain persistence.
Techniques & procedures
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named "WinUpdate". MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script launched via a scheduled task to delete Windows Event Logs. Tarrask may abuse the Windows schtasks command-line tool to create "hidden" scheduled tasks.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named "WinUpdate". MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script launched via a scheduled task to delete Windows Event Logs. Tarrask may abuse the Windows schtasks command-line tool to create "hidden" scheduled tasks.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named "WinUpdate". MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script launched via a scheduled task to delete Windows Event Logs. Tarrask may abuse the Windows schtasks command-line tool to create "hidden" scheduled tasks.
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.
Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.
Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity. FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities. SUNBURST also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Recent activity
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Malware referenced as using scheduled-task hiding via deletion of the Task 'SD' registry value/key (defense evasion).
Tarrask is malware referenced in connection with using scheduled tasks for defense evasion, specifically by deleting or hiding scheduled task security descriptors in the registry to conceal persistence.
A Windows persistence malware/tool used to create hidden scheduled tasks by manipulating Task Scheduler registry keys and deleting the Security Descriptor (SD) value so tasks are hidden from Task Scheduler and schtasks. It also used token theft to obtain SYSTEM-level permissions associated with lsass.exe to delete the SD value and re-establish dropped C2 connections.
A Windows persistence and defense evasion malware used to create hidden scheduled tasks by deleting the Security Descriptor value from the TaskCache\Tree registry path, causing the task to disappear from Task Scheduler and schtasks while maintaining access and re-establishing C2 connectivity.
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Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.