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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

QUIETEXIT

QUIETEXIT is a backdoor/tunneling malware used to gain persistent access, evade detection, and communicate with command-and-control infrastructure. Reported capabilities include proxying traffic via SOCKS, establishing a TCP connection during initial C2 setup, and using an inverse negotiated SSH connection for C2 that reverses traditional SSH client-server roles. It can attempt to connect to a second hard-coded C2 address if the primary hard-coded C2 fails. QUIETEXIT has also been observed attempting to change its process name to "cron" on startup, and samples have been renamed to blend in with legitimate files. Public reporting links QUIETEXIT to APT29 phishing campaigns between 2019 and 2022. Mandiant also reported UNC3524 using the QUIETEXIT tunneler to reduce tool deployment and largely live off the land, with likely server-side QUIETEXIT components identified on compromised, internet-exposed LifeSize conference room cameras and in one case a D-Link IP camera. In that reporting, QUIETEXIT-supported operations targeted victim mail environments and enabled long dwell times, with UNC3524 remaining undetected in some environments for up to approximately 18 months. High-confidence behavioral indicators from the content include SOCKS proxying, inverse SSH-based C2, TCP-based initial C2 connectivity, fallback to a secondary hard-coded C2, and masquerading through renaming such as "cron".

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT29

QUIETEXIT : QUIETEXIT reverses traditional SSH client-server roles.

via cyble blogcyble.com
UNC3524

"The threat actor’s use of the QUIETEXIT tunneler allowed them to largely live off the land..."

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

"The C2 systems... primarily legacy conference room camera systems... and... a D-Link IP camera... infected..." and "MITRE ATT&CK... Resource Development... T1584: Compromise Infrastructure"

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

APT29 was attributed with sending phishing emails impersonating the U.S. Department of State with links to zip files containing malicious Windows shortcuts that delivered the Cobalt Strike Beacon.

Execution

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Scheduled Task/Job (T1053): APT29 installs persistence mechanisms such as scheduled tasks or startup scripts.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

"Find QUIETEXIT persistence mechanisms in the appliance’s rc.local directory..." and "MITRE ATT&CK... Persistence... T1037.004: RC Scripts"

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Scheduled Task/Job (T1053): APT29 installs persistence mechanisms such as scheduled tasks or startup scripts.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547): They modify registry keys or startup folders to ensure the backdoor runs on system boot.

T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

"Find QUIETEXIT persistence mechanisms in the appliance’s rc.local directory..." and "MITRE ATT&CK... Persistence... T1037.004: RC Scripts"

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Scheduled Task/Job (T1053): APT29 installs persistence mechanisms such as scheduled tasks or startup scripts.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547): They modify registry keys or startup folders to ensure the backdoor runs on system boot.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Defense Evasion T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information .001: Binary Padding .002: Software Packing .003: Steganography .005: Indicator Removal from Tools .006: HTML Smuggling

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
TacticStealth
T1036.009Break Process TreesEvidence1
TacticStealth

Cyclops Blink can rename its running process to [kworker:0/1] to masquerade as a Linux kernel thread.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.004SSHEvidence2

QUIETEXIT reverses traditional SSH client-server roles. On a compromised system, the client establishes a TCP connection and acts as the SSH server, while the threat actor’s component initiates the SSH connection and sends a password.

T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

"MITRE ATT&CK... Command and Control... T1071: Application Layer Protocol"

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1
T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence2

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

"MITRE ATT&CK... Command and Control... T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol"

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

"The threat actor’s use of the QUIETEXIT tunneler..." and "MITRE ATT&CK... Command and Control... T1572: Protocol Tunneling"

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Command and Control T1573: Encrypted Channel .001: Symmetric Cryptography .002: Asymmetric Cryptography

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

"MITRE ATT&CK... Command and Control... T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography"

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping18

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.