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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

Pony

Pony is an information-stealing malware family, also referred to in the content as Pony/FAREIT and sometimes associated with Evil Pony as follow-on malware in some infection chains. It is repeatedly described as a credential stealer and spyware used to steal saved credentials from browsers, email clients, and FTP clients. The content also states that Pony has used the NetUserEnum function to enumerate local accounts, has used scripts to delete itself after execution, and communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP in some cases.

Observed delivery vectors in the content are primarily phishing and exploit-driven. Pony has been delivered via spearphishing attachments and spearphishing emails containing malicious links, and has attempted to lure targets into downloading attached executables in ZIP, RAR, or CAB archives or documents such as PDF and Microsoft Office files. It is also associated with exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office and with Adobe Flash exploitation around CVE-2015-0311, where Bedep was observed retrieving Pony. Additional chains in the content include H1N1 delivering Pony DLLs, a campaign where a C2 server sent a Pony variant DLL to an infected Windows client, and fake crack/keygen SFX archives that dropped Pony, AZORULT, and Raspberry Robin.

The malware appears in multiple criminal ecosystems and campaigns. The content links Pony to Nigerian BEC actors tracked as SilverTerrier and to the Nigerian BEC group TMT, both of which used publicly available stealers and RATs including Pony. Pony was also common as follow-on malware in Hancitor infections, which most often included Pony and Evil Pony. Cisco Talos identified infrastructure overlap between a 2018 FormBook campaign and a February 2017 Pony campaign, suggesting possible actor reuse of infrastructure. Spamhaus reporting cited 69 Pony-associated botnet C&C servers, and another trend report noted Pony held the top credential-stealer position for two years before Loki overtook it in 2018.

High-confidence indicators and associations directly mentioned in the content include the alias Pony/FAREIT; use with CVE-2017-11882; retrieval via Bedep in CVE-2015-0311 activity; delivery by H1N1; use by SilverTerrier and TMT; follow-on use with Hancitor; and the following infrastructure from the Talos-referenced Pony/FormBook overlap: hxxp://alphastand[.]top/alien/fre.php, hxxp://alphastand[.]trade/alien/fre.php, hxxp://alphastand[.]win/alien/fre.php, hxxp://kbfvzoboss[.]bid/alien/fre.php, and hxxp://ukonlinejfk[.]ru/mine/fre.php.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code Execution

CVE-2017-11882 ... Products Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT | CVE-2017-11882 ... Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT | CVE-2017-11882 Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016 Products Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
CVE-2015-0311Adobe Flash Player remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2015-0311)Exploited in the wild

CVE-2015-0311 (Flash up to 16.0.0.287) integrating Exploit Kits Patched with Flash 16.0.0.296 ... first seen exploited by Angler EK ... soon after used in standalone mode in huge malvert campaign ... integrated today in RIG ... Fiesta ... Nuclear Pack ... Sweet Orange ... Neutrino ... Magnitude | ...Bedep (doing adfraud and grabbing malware : Pony mostly from what I saw)... CVE-2015-0311 used in standalone mode to drop Bedep grab Pony and perform adfraud...

via malware dontneedcoffeemalware.dontneedcoffee.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilverTerrier

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
TMT

The group relied exclusively on a variety of publicly available spyware and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), including AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, Pony, and NetWire.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
TA505

These early campaigns were distributed via the Lerspeng downloader while later campaigns occasionally used Pony or Andromeda as intermediate loaders...

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

CVE-2015-0311 has been first seen exploited by Angler EK ... soon after used in "standalone" mode in huge malvert campaign ... Top adult site xHamster involved in large malvertising campaign

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The gang used well-crafted emails impersonating legitimate companies to conduct mass email phishing campaigns and distribute popular malware strains. They made their emails look like purchasing orders, product inquiries, and COVID-19 aid schemes.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

Multiple actors and malware families are described as being delivered via spearphishing/phishing emails containing malicious links (e.g., APT28 used URL shorteners to redirect to credential harvesting sites; APT29 used links to ZIP files; APT33 used links to .hta files; BlackTech used links to cloud services; Wizard Spider used links to Google Drive/free file hosting). | APT29 used links to ZIP files containing malicious files; APT33 used links to .hta files; Leviathan used lookalike domains and stolen branding; Machete used links to external servers with ZIP/RAR archives; LazyScripter used links that redirect to download a malicious document; FIN8 used links to malicious documents with embedded macros.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution. Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

CVE-2015-0311 has been first seen exploited by Angler EK ... soon after used in "standalone" mode in huge malvert campaign ... CVE-2015-0311 has been integrated today in RIG ... Fiesta successfully exploit Windows XP IE8 Flash 16.0.0.257 using CVE-2015-0311 ... Nuclear Pack successfully exploit ... using CVE-2015-0311 ... Sweet Orange firing exploit for CVE-2015-0311 ... Neutrino firing his bundle of Sploit ... Magnitude - CVE-2015-0311 exploited successfully

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2
TacticExecution

Examples include: "Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros..."; "Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs"; "Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files."

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4
TacticStealth

To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1
TacticStealth

"Bumblebee has been delivered as password-protected zipped ISO files" / "Flagpro has been delivered within ZIP or RAR password-protected archived files." / "TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents."

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence7
TacticStealth

Anchor has used cmd.exe to run its self deletion routine. Gelsemium can use a batch script to delete itself. Pony has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution. Lazarus Group used a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

Information stealers seem to be the preferred type of malware to help in their fraudulent email attacks... The attacker can pilfer data about the targets and use it to create efficient messages for diverting transactions or asking money to be sent to fraudsters' account.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“actors used the following commands… to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download; net user /domain >> %temp%\download … APT1 used the commands net localgroup, net user, and net group to find accounts… APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators … OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain …”

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1
T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Examples include "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language," and "Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the GetUSerDefaultUILanguage function."

Collection

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Once deployed, the malware communicated with the attackers’ command-and-control (C&C) servers using common protocols like SMTP, FTP, and HTTP.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Examples include 'BeaverTail ... HTTP POST to exfiltrate data to C2 infrastructure,' 'SolarWinds Compromise ... APT29 used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration,' and 'StealBit can use HTTP to exfiltrate files to actor-controlled infrastructure.'

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The stolen credentials were then sent to predefined email addresses controlled by the attackers, enabling unauthorized access to victims’ accounts and systems.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1
TacticImpact

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

271 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
7 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
262 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching271

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping24

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.