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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

CharmPower

CharmPower is a PowerShell-based malware associated with the Iranian threat ecosystem, with reporting indicating it is likely a successor to GorjolEcho/PowerStar, TAMECURL, and MischiefTut. The provided content attributes it to activity overlapping APT42/TA453 tradecraft. Its capabilities include PowerShell-based payload execution and command-and-control communication, retrieval of C2 domain information from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets, and downloading additional modules from actor-controlled S3 buckets. It can also receive additional modules over C2 encoded with Base64. On compromised Windows hosts, CharmPower can use wmic to gather system information, enumerate Uninstall registry values, and list installed applications. Collection capabilities explicitly mentioned include screenshot capture. For exfiltration, it can send gathered data to a hardcoded C2 URL via HTTP POST, and separate reporting in the content states it can also send victim data via FTP using hardcoded credentials in the script. Cleanup and anti-forensics behaviors mentioned include removing persistence-related artifacts from the Registry and deleting created files from the compromised system. The content references CharmPower versions 1.0 to 1.1.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Magic Hound

The toolset observed in this infection chain is likely the successor of GorjolEcho/PowerStar, TAMECURL, MischiefTut, and CharmPower.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Proofpoint identified a cluster of spear phishing targeting scholars with backgrounds in women’s and gender studies at a variety of North American universities.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

This document, which was uploaded to VirusTotal, used remote template injection to download multiple .dotm files from office-updates[.]info and is attributed to TA453.

Execution

3 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1137Office Application StartupEvidence1

As detailed by PwC, the downloaded template establishes persistence by replacing the user’s previous default Microsoft Word template.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity. FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities. SUNBURST also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

This document, which was uploaded to VirusTotal, used remote template injection to download multiple .dotm files from office-updates[.]info and is attributed to TA453.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

Examples include 'Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host,' 'Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information,' and 'Volt Typhoon has leveraged WMIC for execution, remote system discovery.'

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence3

"Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications"; "Dridex has collected a list of installed software on the system"; "Tropic Trooper's backdoor could list the infected system's installed software"; "Windigo has used a script to detect installed software"

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
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IOC matching2

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.