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MalwareUsed by 4 actors

RedLeaves

Also known asBUGJUICE

RedLeaves is a Windows remote administration Trojan/backdoor, also referred to as BUGJUICE in the provided content. It has been associated most notably with APT10/MenuPass and more broadly with multiple China-nexus threat actors. Reporting cited in the content links RedLeaves to Chinese cyber-espionage activity targeting Japanese defense organizations, global IT service providers and their customers, and sectors including information technology, energy, healthcare, communications, critical manufacturing, aerospace, defense, government, technology, telecommunications, and manufacturing. More recent reporting also notes its use by or overlap with activity tracked as UAT-7290, a China-linked actor targeting telecommunications providers in South Asia and Southeastern Europe.

The malware is described as a feature-rich backdoor with capabilities including system enumeration, remote shell access, tunneling and reverse proxying traffic, downloading and executing files, file discovery, drive enumeration, data exfiltration, screenshot capture, deletion of specified files, collection of browser usernames and passwords, and obtaining information about the logged-on user locally and through Remote Desktop sessions. One report describes it as a Visual C++ RAT that compresses outbound data with LZO and encrypts command-and-control traffic with RC4. The content specifically notes RC4 keys observed in different reporting, including "john1234" (with a null byte appended in one analyzed sample) and previously observed keys "88888888" and "babybear."

Execution and persistence commonly rely on DLL side-loading / DLL search order hijacking. The content describes RedLeaves being launched by executing a benign file that loads a malicious DLL, including an observed chain involving VeetlePlayer.exe, a malicious libvlc.dll loader, and an encoded payload file named mtcReport.ktc. In the analyzed execution flow, shellcode created a suspended svchost.exe process, injected the implant with WriteProcessMemory, and resumed the process. Observed mutexes include RedLeavesCMDSimulatorMutex and QN4869MD.

For command and control, RedLeaves has been observed communicating over TCP port 443 without SSL, creating a port/protocol mismatch that can appear as non-SSL traffic on a port commonly associated with HTTPS. It can also use a custom binary protocol and, if directed by C2, HTTP or HTTPS. A hard-coded C2 domain noted in the content is windowsupdates.dnset.com. Defenders are specifically advised in the source reporting to look for plaintext HTTP or other non-SSL traffic over port 443 as a possible indicator.

The content also states that CrowdStrike found RedLeaves samples used against Japanese defense groups were directly sourced from Trochilus code, though it also notes there was no conclusive evidence that RedLeaves was solely attributable to STONE PANDA/APT10. High-confidence aliases present in the content are RedLeaves and BUGJUICE.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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menuPass

Falcon Intelligence recently independently conducted detailed analysis of the RedLeaves malware used to target numerous Japanese defense groups and found it was directly sourced from Trochilus code

via crowdstrike blogweb.archive.org
UAT-7290

UAT-7290 primarily leverages a Linux based malware suite but may also utilize Windows based bespoke implants such as RedLeaves ... commonly linked to China-nexus threat actors.

via talos intelligence blogblog.talosintelligence.com
CTG-5938

Tools QuasarRAT, RedLeaves, PoisonIvy, ChChes, QuasarRAT Loader, PlugX, ANEL, Cobalt Strike

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
Liminal Panda

Some of the notable Windows implants ... include RedLeaves (aka BUGJUICE) and ShadowPad

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

According to preliminary analysis, threat actors appear to be leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and certificates... User impersonation via compromised credentials is the primary mechanism used by the adversary.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

It prioritizes initial access to edge networking devices... Mitigation Harden edge networking devices by eliminating default credentials, restricting management exposure, and rapidly patching known one-day vulnerabilities.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Often deployed via spear phishing, they are lightweight, have particular capabilities and are designed to facilitate system identification and lateral movement.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

Baobeilong (宝贝龙/”Baby Dragon”) also maintained a GitHub account that had forked both the Quasar and Trochilus RATs, two open-source tools historically used by STONE PANDA... Falcon Intelligence recently independently conducted detailed analysis of the RedLeaves malware... found it was directly sourced from Trochilus code

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence4
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.' | Many entries explicitly state malware 'can create a reverse shell' or 'launch a remote shell,' including 4H RAT, AuditCred, BLACKCOFFEE, Carbanak, DarkComet, Exaramel for Windows, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and ZxShell.

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence1
TacticExecution

Start up a so called "RedLeavesCMDSimulator" - a console session that will accept commands from the memory pipe \\.\pipe\NamePipe_MoreWindows.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

According to preliminary analysis, threat actors appear to be leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and certificates... User impersonation via compromised credentials is the primary mechanism used by the adversary.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder. | Multiple entries describe creating .lnk shortcuts in Startup folders, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory and DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The content repeatedly notes creation of '.lnk shortcut' files in the Startup folder, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut in CSIDL_STARTUP, DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder, and Operation Dream Job placing LNK files into victims' startup folder.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The shellcode then activates a new instance of svchost.exe and suspends it. It then makes a call to WriteProcessMemory() and inserts the implant with the damaged MZ and PE headers into its memory space. It then resumes execution of svchost.exe, which runs the implant.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

According to preliminary analysis, threat actors appear to be leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and certificates... User impersonation via compromised credentials is the primary mechanism used by the adversary.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder. | Multiple entries describe creating .lnk shortcuts in Startup folders, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory and DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The content repeatedly notes creation of '.lnk shortcut' files in the Startup folder, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut in CSIDL_STARTUP, DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder, and Operation Dream Job placing LNK files into victims' startup folder.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

Many of these domains spoof legitimate sites and content, with a particular focus on spoofing Windows update sites.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The shellcode then activates a new instance of svchost.exe and suspends it. It then makes a call to WriteProcessMemory() and inserts the implant with the damaged MZ and PE headers into its memory space. It then resumes execution of svchost.exe, which runs the implant.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

According to preliminary analysis, threat actors appear to be leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and certificates... User impersonation via compromised credentials is the primary mechanism used by the adversary.

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

ChChes targets the credentials stored inside Internet Explorer

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

BUGJUICE... has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data...

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

BUGJUICE... has the capability to... take screenshots

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Network activity is often seen as POST requests... Even though the beacon went to port 443... this traffic was plaintext HTTP, as is common for this variant of PLUGX.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Download a file from a specified URL, and save it under a specified filename;

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Most of the known domains leverage dynamic DNS services, and this pattern adds to the complexity of tracking this activity.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Command and Control (C2) primarily occurs using RC4 cipher communications over port 443 to domains that change IP addresses.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

BUGJUICE... has the capability to... exfiltrate data... The tactic also serves to mask malicious C2 and exfiltration traffic and make it appear innocuous.

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Threat actor attribution4

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Exploited vulnerabilities

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping27

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.