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BruteRatel C4 (BRc4)

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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

“abuse legitimate services like file-hosting services and business profile pages…”, “downloaded a ZIP file… from Dropbox”, “received a JavaScript file from Firebase”

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

campaigns using RaccoonO365 have been active since September 2024. These attacks typically mimic trusted brands like Microsoft, DocuSign, SharePoint, Adobe, and Maersk in fraudulent emails, tricking them into clicking on lookalike pages that are designed to capture victims' Microsoft 365 usernames and passwords.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“The emails contained a PDF attachment…”, “The email contained a hyperlink that directed users to download a malicious Excel file.”

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“outcome depended on whether their system and IP address were allowed… If access was restricted, the user received a benign PDF… as a decoy to evade detection” | “The malicious PDF attachment contained an embedded URL. If the attachment was opened and the URL clicked, a ZIP file was downloaded from Dropbox.” | “embedded DoubleClick URL that redirected users to a Rebrandly URL shortening link… redirected… to a landing site that displayed a fake DocuSign page”

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“If executed, this JavaScript file downloaded…”, “If the user opened the Excel file… enable macros…”, “If launched by the user, the .lnk file uses PowerShell…”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Earlier this April, the Redmond-based company warned of several phishing campaigns leveraging tax-related themes to deploy malware such as Latrodectus, AHKBot, GuLoader, and BruteRatel C4 (BRc4). The phishing pages, it added, were delivered via RaccoonO365

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

“displayed a fake DocuSign page hosted on a domain masquerading as DocuSign… .lnk files set up to mimic tax documents.”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

“Latrodectus… features dynamic command-and-control (C2) configurations…”, “Both Looper and Screenshotter used the C2 IP address 181.49.105[.]59”

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.