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Mallory
Malware

META

META is an information-stealing malware family, also described as deriving from or being marketed as an improved version of RedLine. Reporting in the provided content describes META as a newer infostealer that gained popularity among cybercriminals, including availability on the TwoEasy botnet marketplace for $125 per month or $1,000 lifetime access. It steals passwords from Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Firefox, as well as cryptocurrency wallet data. The content also places META among infostealers capable of bypassing App-Bound Encryption.

A documented delivery chain used malspam with macro-enabled Excel attachments themed around bogus fund transfers and DocuSign lures. When a victim enabled content, a malicious VBS macro executed in the background, downloaded multiple DLL and EXE payloads from sites including GitHub, used Base64 encoding and reversed-byte payloads for evasion, and assembled a final executable named "qwveqwveqw.exe." META established persistence via a new Windows Registry key and continued C2 communications after reboot. It also used PowerShell to weaken defenses by modifying Windows Defender exclusions so .exe files would not be scanned.

The provided content identifies command-and-control traffic to 193.106.191[.]162 and notes that Brad Duncan published a PCAP of the infection traffic. META was also named in international law-enforcement disruption activity: in October 2024, Operation Magnus seized domains, servers, and Telegram accounts associated with RedLine and META, with reporting stating authorities gained complete access to the servers behind both infostealers. Multiple references in the content describe META as one of the infostealers disrupted during that operation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The infection chain in the particular campaign follows the "standard" approach of a macro-laced Excel spreadsheet arriving in prospective victims' inboxes as email attachments.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

One thing to note is that META modifies Windows Defender via PowerShell to exclude .exe files from scanning, to protect its files from detection.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The spreadsheet files feature a DocuSign lure that urges the target to "enable content" required to run the malicious VBS macro in the background.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The spreadsheet files feature a DocuSign lure that urges the target to "enable content" required to run the malicious VBS macro in the background.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Eventually, the final payload is assembled on the machine under the name "qwveqwveqw.exe," which is likely random, and a new registry key is added for persistence.

T1556.006Multi-Factor AuthenticationEvidence1

These fingerprints meant the criminals could access ... without triggering security warnings ... Users could even bypass multi-factor authentication.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Eventually, the final payload is assembled on the machine under the name "qwveqwveqw.exe," which is likely random, and a new registry key is added for persistence.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

Multiple families have successfully bypassed App-Bound Encryption including Phemedrone, LummaC2, Meduza, Vidar, StealC, Rhadamanthys, WhiteSnake, Meta, and Lumar.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Some of the downloaded files are base64 encoded or have their bytes reversed to bypass detection by security software.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556.006Multi-Factor AuthenticationEvidence1

These fingerprints meant the criminals could access ... without triggering security warnings ... Users could even bypass multi-factor authentication.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

“When executed, RedLine would steal data, including access devices, from victims’ computers.” Infostealers thieve billions of user credentials such as passwords annually.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

provided criminals access to “bots” or “browser fingerprints” ... including IP addresses, session cookies, operating system information, and plugins

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence5

META is actively used in attacks, being deployed to steal passwords stored in Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, as well as cryptocurrency wallets.

T1556.006Multi-Factor AuthenticationEvidence1

These fingerprints meant the criminals could access ... without triggering security warnings ... Users could even bypass multi-factor authentication.

Collection

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

“When executed, RedLine would steal data, including access devices, from victims’ computers.” Infostealers thieve billions of user credentials such as passwords annually.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

A clear and persistent sign of the infection is the EXE file generating traffic to a command and control server at 193.106.191[.]162, even after the system reboots, restarting the infection process on the compromised machine.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

When the malicious script runs, it will download various payloads, including DLLs and executables, from multiple sites, such as GitHub.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“When executed, RedLine would steal data, including access devices, from victims’ computers.”

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

One thing to note is that META modifies Windows Defender via PowerShell to exclude .exe files from scanning, to protect its files from detection.

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping15

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.