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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

NosyDownloader

NosyDownloader is a malware downloader used by the China-aligned APT group LongNosedGoblin in cyber-espionage operations targeting government entities in Southeast Asia and Japan since at least 2023. It is part of the group’s custom C#/.NET toolset and is used for payload delivery, retrieving and executing additional malware directly in memory to reduce disk artifacts and complicate forensic analysis. ESET reported that LongNosedGoblin used NosyDownloader widely in Southeast Asia throughout 2024, with an updated version observed against the Japanese government by December 2024. The malware was also found embedded in originally benign applications that had been patched with malicious code. Its execution chain involves spawning PowerShell and passing a long, obfuscated command line so the script is not stored on disk. NosyDownloader has been used to deploy payloads including NosyLogger, the open-source reverse SOCKS5 proxy ReverseSocks5, and an argument runner. High-confidence associated context links it to LongNosedGoblin’s broader espionage activity against government networks and to in-memory payload execution as a core capability. No specific IoCs beyond these behavioral characteristics are provided in the content.

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LongNosedGoblin

"NosyDownloader, which downloads and runs a payload in memory... LongNosedGoblin has been widely using NosyDownloader in Southeast Asia throughout 2024."

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