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MalwareRansomwareExploits 3 CVEs

ABYSSWORKER

ABYSSWORKER is a malicious Windows kernel-mode driver/rootkit used primarily as an EDR killer and defense-evasion component in ransomware intrusions. Reporting describes it as a custom malicious driver masquerading as a legitimate Palo Alto driver, while Elastic Security Labs analyzed a 64-bit Windows PE driver named smuol.sys that imitates a legitimate CrowdStrike Falcon driver. It has also been referred to as Poortry, and Elastic assessed Google Cloud Mandiant’s 2022 POORTRY disclosure as likely the earliest public mention of the same driver family.

ABYSSWORKER has been observed in financially motivated campaigns, especially alongside MEDUSA ransomware, where a HEARTCRYPT-packed loader installs the driver and uses it to target and silence different EDR vendors. ESET also reported AbyssKiller, a commercially sold tool pairing the ABYSSWORKER rootkit with a HeartCrypt-packed loader, as one of the most frequently seen commercial EDR killers in the wild. Telemetry linked AbyssKiller/ABYSSWORKER usage to affiliates associated with Medusa, DragonForce, and the now-disrupted BlackSuit gang. Symantec also reported DragonForce actors using ABYSSWORKER in a December 2025 intrusion against a major U.S. services company. Additional reporting cited its use in BYOVD-style attacks to terminate antivirus processes and disable endpoint security products, including in an Osiris ransomware intrusion.

Technically, ABYSSWORKER is signed with likely stolen and revoked certificates from Chinese companies. Elastic observed samples on VirusTotal dated from 2024-08-08 to 2025-02-24, with most packed using VMProtect. The driver uses obfuscation including constant-returning functions, opaque predicates, and derivation functions. During initialization it resolves kernel module pointers, creates a device at \device\czx9umpTReqbOOKF and a symbolic link at \??\fqg0Et4KlNt4s1JT, and initializes a client-protection mechanism.

Its capabilities include protecting the malware client process by stripping existing handles from other processes and registering ObRegisterCallback pre-operation callbacks to deny new handles to protected processes and threads. Through multiple IOCTL handlers, it supports file manipulation, process and thread termination, callback removal, driver tampering, mini-filter detachment, hook restoration, and system rebooting. Elastic reported a hardcoded enablement password delivered via IOCTL 0x222080: 7N6bCAoECbItsUR5-h4Rp2nkQxybfKb0F-wgbJGHGh20pWUuN1-ZxfXdiOYps6HTp0X. IOCTL 0x2220c0 loads kernel API pointers and related structures, including callback lists and 25 function mappings supplied by the client.

Documented kernel-level actions include removing registered notification callbacks associated with PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine, PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine, ObRegisterCallbacks, and CmRegisterCallback; removing MiniFilter callbacks and devices by module name; replacing all major functions of a targeted driver module with IopInvalidDeviceRequest; detaching devices associated with FltMgr.sys; brute-forcing thread IDs to locate system threads belonging to a targeted module and terminating them via APCs that call PsTerminateSystemThread; restoring original major functions for NTFS and PNP drivers when hooks are detected outside legitimate modules; and rebooting the machine via HalReturnToFirmware. It also performs file copy and deletion by manually constructing IRPs and invoking device major functions directly.

Overall, ABYSSWORKER is best characterized as a commercially used kernel-mode EDR-killer/rootkit employed in ransomware operations to gain kernel privileges, disable security tooling, and facilitate later-stage encryption and data theft activity.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

3 CVES
CVE-2023-52271Arbitrary PPL Process Termination in Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sysExploited in the wild

Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2025-61155Arbitrary Process Termination via GameDriverX64.sys IOCTL Access Control FlawExploited in the wild

Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2025-1055Arbitrary privileged process termination via K7 Security K7RKScan.sys IOCTLsExploited in the wild

Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence3

The researchers also highlight the exploitation of Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys driver ('Havoc Process Terminator'), which is used for evasion in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) tactics.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

The binary is a 64-bit Windows PE driver named smuol.sys, and imitates a legitimate CrowdStrike Falcon driver.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

These constant-returning functions are called repeatedly throughout the binary to hinder static analysis.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Additionally, it removes callbacks registered through a MiniFilter driver and, optionally, removes devices belonging to a specific module.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

The deletion handler sets the file attribute to ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL to unprotect any read-only file and sets the file disposition to delete (disposition_info.DeleteFile = 1) to remove the file using the IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION IRP.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

All samples are signed using likely stolen, revoked certificates from Chinese companies.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

With these two handlers you can terminate any process or a thread by their PID or Thread ID (TID) using PsTerminateProcess and PsTerminateThread.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Cybercriminals are increasingly bringing their own drivers — either exploiting a vulnerable legitimate driver or using a custom-built driver to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems and evade detection or prevention capabilities.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities3

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.