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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Dustman

Dustman is a destructive wiper malware in the Iranian wiper ecosystem and is described as a variant or successor closely related to ZeroCleare. Public reporting in the provided content states that Dustman was identified as a new variant similar to ZeroCleare and that both families mirrored Shamoon’s use of modified legitimate drivers to achieve destructive effects. The malware is tied in the content to Iranian state-aligned activity, particularly APT34/OilRig, and is also referenced more broadly as part of Iran’s arsenal of more than 15 wiper families. Dustman was reportedly deployed heavily against energy and industrial sector targets, including Saudi energy-sector targeting, and is mentioned alongside operations affecting Bahrain’s Bapco in late 2019 and early 2020. The content further notes that infrastructure associated with the Fox Kitten campaign could potentially be used to spread and activate destructive malware such as ZeroCleare and Dustman. High-confidence behavioral detail in the provided material is limited, but the core described capability is destructive wiping using modified legitimate drivers in a manner similar to Shamoon/ZeroCleare. No specific indicators of compromise are provided in the content.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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OilRig

“...it can also be used as a platform for spreading and activating destructive malware such as ZeroCleare and Dustman, tied to APT34.”

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique
T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

ZeroCleare and Dustman mirrored Shamoon’s reliance on modified legitimate drivers to achieve destructive effects.

Impact

2 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence3

Instead, they opted for rapid, recursive file-level destruction, overwriting targeted files with 4096-byte blocks of random data.

T1561Disk WipeEvidence1

These attacks utilized spearphishing to gain initial access, eventually relying on the Eldos RawDisk driver to bypass Windows APIs and overwrite the master boot record (MBR).

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.