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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

3proxy

3proxy is an open-source, dual-use proxy utility that has been observed deployed by North Korean-linked threat actors, particularly Andariel (also tracked as Silent Chollima, Stonefly, and Onyx Sleet), to maintain access and provide proxy/tunneling capability inside victim environments. The provided reporting describes 3proxy as part of intrusion chains associated with DTrack and Maui ransomware activity, including one case where a 3proxy binary compiled on 2020-09-09 was deployed to a victim on 2020-12-25, months before DTrack and Maui were executed on the same server. In another intrusion, a file renamed from osc.tmp to osc.exe was assessed with high confidence to be 3proxy, and was used alongside PuTTY plink to create proxying and reverse-tunneled access into victim networks. The content identifies 3proxy as one of several open-source or dual-use tools used or customized by Andariel for execution, tunneling, concealment, and maintaining access. Associated campaigns in the source material involved exploitation of internet-facing services such as HFS and Oracle WebLogic (including CVE-2017-10271), as well as broader Andariel exploitation of public-facing web servers and VMware Horizon/Log4j in separate reporting. Victim sectors and geographies mentioned in the surrounding activity include healthcare, energy, defense, aerospace, nuclear, engineering, and organizations in Japan, India, the United States, Canada, and elsewhere. High-confidence indicators directly tied to 3proxy in the content are limited to the malware/tool name, the renamed file osc.exe assessed as 3proxy, and the compilation/deployment timing noted above.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Andariel

Suspicious 3proxy tool... The “3Proxy” tool... was compiled on 2020-09-09 and deployed to the victim on 2020-12-25... used... to maintain access.

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

We have no evidence to suggest that the LaiXi developers deliberately embedded the malicious file into their product, or that a threat actor conducted a supply chain attack...

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

Sophos said it discovered in December 2023 a malicious executable ("Catalog.exe" ... ) that's signed by a valid Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher (WHCP) certificate.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

Present within the purported authentication service is a component called 3proxy that's designed to monitor and intercept network traffic on an infected system, effectively acting as a backdoor.

Collection

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

Present within the purported authentication service is a component called 3proxy that's designed to monitor and intercept network traffic on an infected system, effectively acting as a backdoor.

T1090ProxyEvidence3

Spent days trying to implement a multi-hop SOCKS5 proxy chain before I even had a working C2 ... What I tried: Dante proxies, 3proxy chains, multi-hop obfuscation, rotating IPs.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

"Utilities such as 3Proxy... tunnel command-and-control traffic..."

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

"...preceded by 3proxy months earlier." and "Using legitimate proxy and tunneling tools after initial infection or deploying them to maintain access"

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

"C2 tunneling: Utilities such as 3Proxy, PLINK, and Stunnel tunnel command-and-control traffic over legitimate protocols, masking data transfer activity."

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.