3proxy
3proxy is an open-source, dual-use proxy utility that has been observed deployed by North Korean-linked threat actors, particularly Andariel (also tracked as Silent Chollima, Stonefly, and Onyx Sleet), to maintain access and provide proxy/tunneling capability inside victim environments. The provided reporting describes 3proxy as part of intrusion chains associated with DTrack and Maui ransomware activity, including one case where a 3proxy binary compiled on 2020-09-09 was deployed to a victim on 2020-12-25, months before DTrack and Maui were executed on the same server. In another intrusion, a file renamed from osc.tmp to osc.exe was assessed with high confidence to be 3proxy, and was used alongside PuTTY plink to create proxying and reverse-tunneled access into victim networks. The content identifies 3proxy as one of several open-source or dual-use tools used or customized by Andariel for execution, tunneling, concealment, and maintaining access. Associated campaigns in the source material involved exploitation of internet-facing services such as HFS and Oracle WebLogic (including CVE-2017-10271), as well as broader Andariel exploitation of public-facing web servers and VMware Horizon/Log4j in separate reporting. Victim sectors and geographies mentioned in the surrounding activity include healthcare, energy, defense, aerospace, nuclear, engineering, and organizations in Japan, India, the United States, Canada, and elsewhere. High-confidence indicators directly tied to 3proxy in the content are limited to the malware/tool name, the renamed file osc.exe assessed as 3proxy, and the compilation/deployment timing noted above.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Suspicious 3proxy tool... The “3Proxy” tool... was compiled on 2020-09-09 and deployed to the victim on 2020-12-25... used... to maintain access.
Techniques & procedures
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 techniqueWe have no evidence to suggest that the LaiXi developers deliberately embedded the malicious file into their product, or that a threat actor conducted a supply chain attack...
Defense Impairment
1 techniqueSophos said it discovered in December 2023 a malicious executable ("Catalog.exe" ... ) that's signed by a valid Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher (WHCP) certificate.
Credential Access
1 techniqueCollection
1 techniqueCommand and Control
4 techniquesSpent days trying to implement a multi-hop SOCKS5 proxy chain before I even had a working C2 ... What I tried: Dante proxies, 3proxy chains, multi-hop obfuscation, rotating IPs.
"Utilities such as 3Proxy... tunnel command-and-control traffic..."
"...preceded by 3proxy months earlier." and "Using legitimate proxy and tunneling tools after initial infection or deploying them to maintain access"
"C2 tunneling: Utilities such as 3Proxy, PLINK, and Stunnel tunnel command-and-control traffic over legitimate protocols, masking data transfer activity."
IOCs tracked for this family
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Legitimate proxy utility abused to stand up a local SOCKS/HTTP proxy on compromised hosts; used with SSH reverse tunneling (plink) to provide attacker-side access into victim networks.
Legitimate proxy/tunneling tool abused by the actor post-compromise to maintain access and support operations inside victim networks.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.