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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

ScareCrow

ScareCrow is a payload creation framework referenced in the content as being used to generate a Go-based dropper that staged a Cobalt Strike payload. In the described UNC2465 intrusion, an in-memory dropper created with the ScareCrow framework was downloaded via UltraVNC to C:\ProgramData\Cisco Systems\Cisco Jabber\update.exe and executed with cmd.exe. Its execution resulted in creation of a Cobalt Strike stageless payload at C:\ProgramData\Cisco\update.exe. The content states the framework is integrated with tactics for unhooking and bypassing EDR products while remaining undetected, and also discusses related tradecraft such as spoofing file metadata and blending into normal endpoint and network telemetry. The observed sample masqueraded as a Cisco Jabber updater. Associated infrastructure for the resulting Beacon included domain w2doger[.]xyz and IP 185.231.68.102. The activity was attributed in the report context to UNC2465, which used the ScareCrow-generated dropper alongside other tooling including SMOKEDHAM, UltraVNC, ngrok tunneling, a keylogger, and LSASS dumping during a supply-chain-compromise intrusion involving trojanized installers for SmartPSS and SVStation.

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UNC2465

Update.exe was a Go based dropper created using the ScareCrow framework... resulted in the creation of a Cobalt Strike stageless payload

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

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1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"Mandiant then observed the attacker use UltraVNC to download two LNK files..." and "The attacker used UltraVNC to download an in-memory dropper for Cobalt Strike..."

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