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Malware

Morris worm

The Morris Worm is a self-replicating network worm released by Robert Tappan Morris on November 2, 1988, and widely regarded as the first major Internet worm. It spread across Internet-connected university, government, military, and research systems, flooding the ARPANET/Internet and causing thousands of hosts to crash or become unusable through uncontrolled replication and resource exhaustion. Multiple sources in the content state it affected about 6,000 machines and disrupted educational institutions, military sites, medical research facilities, universities, laboratories, and research institutes.

The worm was designed to propagate autonomously and used several infection vectors directly mentioned in the content: exploitation of a bug in SENDMAIL, exploitation of a bug in the Unix finger daemon, abuse of trusted-host relationships, and password guessing. The content also specifically states that it spread in part by exploiting a stack buffer overflow in the Unix finger server. Morris attempted to make the worm spread widely while avoiding detection, including releasing it from an MIT system to obscure its Cornell origin. Its replication logic caused far more reinfection than intended, leading to severe network congestion and system failures.

The stated purpose in the content was to demonstrate or map network security weaknesses, but the worm instead caused major operational disruption. Reported impacts include computers crashing or becoming catatonic, widespread service disruption, and response costs ranging from hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars per affected installation; other cited damage estimates range from at least $200,000 to as high as $95 million. The incident led to the creation of the CERT Coordination Center in November 1988 and Robert Tappan Morris became the first person convicted under the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for releasing it.

High-confidence identifiers and context from the content include the name Morris Worm / Morris worm / Internet Worm, release date November 2, 1988, creator Robert Tappan Morris, and targeting of Unix-connected Internet hosts via finger, sendmail, trusted relationships, and password guessing.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

Вируси (Viruses) и Червеи (Worms) Тъй като повечето хакери имат програмистки умения, те могат да сами да създават вируси и червеи, който да служат за техните цели.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

A stack buffer overflow can be caused deliberately as part of an attack known as stack smashing... the user can corrupt the stack in such a way as to inject executable code into the running program and take control of the process.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

Worms share some similarities with viruses but spread differently because they do not necessarily require users to open infected files. Instead, worms automatically replicate themselves across connected systems and networks.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“The Morris Worm… launches a worm… spreads to 6,000 networked computers… The Father Christmas worm spreads over DECnet… Christmas Tree EXEC ‘worm’…”

Impact

2 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence2

Worms are a series of code which actually destroy resident software on the host computer.

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Morris unleashed a computer ‘worm’ in 1988 that temporarily shut down Internet, one of the largest computer networks in the US.

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Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.