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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

GnatSpy

GnatSpy is an Android malware family associated with Arid Viper, also known as Desert Falcon and APT-C-23. Public reporting describes it as part of the group’s evolving mobile surveillance tooling and as one of several malware families attributed to the actor over time, alongside VAMP, FrozenCell, DesertScorpion, ViperRAT, SpyC23, and Phenakite. The malware is described as extending the functionality of VAMP by collecting additional device information, specifically battery usage, memory, storage, and SIM card status. Supporting reporting places GnatSpy within Arid Viper’s broader cyber-espionage activity targeting primarily Palestinian individuals and organizations, with other reporting across the same actor cluster also documenting targeting of Israeli and Palestinian victims, including government, security, political, and student-related targets. High-confidence content directly provided here does not include specific GnatSpy infection-chain details or standalone indicators of compromise for this family.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Arid Viper

The ever-changing malware family attributed to APT-C-23 over the years includes VAMP, GnatSpy, FrozenCell, DesertScorpion, and ViperRAT.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

This spike in account creation towards the later half of 2019 was observed alongside an increase in attempts to distribute both iOS and Android malware as well as phish credentials from users.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

In all cases the successful installation of these tools did not require any exploits. This suggests that Arid Viper operators continue to heavily rely on social engineering to distribute their malware.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

Android malware was typically hosted on convincing looking attacker-controlled phishing sites.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The main changes from earlier research centered primarily around code obfuscation being added by those developing this malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

Facebook found recent variants pretending to be popular Android applications for dating, networking, and regional banking in the Middle East.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1
TacticStealth

the values for those C2 domains first contacted weren’t hardcoded in the Java layer, where they would be clearly visible, instead they were encrypted and stored in a separate ELF binary.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Retrieve photos from the camera roll ... Retrieve contacts ... Retrieve text messages ... Search for and return the path of files with a doc or PDF extension

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The analyzed Arid Viper Android malware contained the following functionality: • Take screenshots or record video

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Phenakite periodically recording audio and notifying C2 infrastructure... Similarly, Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos and sends these automatically to attacker infrastructure.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Search for files of specific types and add them to RAR archives for exfiltration

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Use Base64 to obfuscate command and control communications

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Some Primewire samples utilize “multipart/form-data” for command and control check-ins... other samples combine the C2 parameters into a single “application/x-www-form-urlencoded” POST body.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

uploading any files present before recursively uploading any files in subdirectories.

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.