Blister DLL
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
"...deployment of INET RAT and Blister DLL trojans." / "...Blister DLL acts as a shellcode loader to establish remote access."
Techniques & procedures
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique“Both relied heavily on phishing emails delivering malicious ZIP archives and LNK files… The group lures victims with deceptive documents disguised as résumés… used ZIP attachments containing LNK and VBScript files.”
Execution
1 technique“UNG0002 prefers using LNK shortcuts… Both relied heavily on… LNK files to initiate complex malware deployment chains.”
Stealth
1 technique“Blister DLL acts as a shellcode loader to establish remote access.”
Recent activity
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.