Catena
Catena is a multi-stage, memory-resident loader observed in phishing-led intrusion chains attributed to the China-based Silver Fox threat group. In the reported campaigns, Silver Fox gained initial access through phishing emails using fake tax audit notices and counterfeit software update alerts, then deployed malware including ValleyRAT, AtlasCross RAT, and the Catena loader. The infection chain included disguised shortcut files and malicious Office documents with hidden macros, with second-stage payloads delivered from cloud storage infrastructure. Catena is described as shellcode-based, and one observed execution chain used DLL sideloading in which WavesSvc64.exe loaded a malicious DuiLib_u.dll that read encrypted shellcode from box.ini, decrypted it, and executed it in memory; this behavior was assessed as consistent with the Catena loader pattern documented by Rapid7. The broader Silver Fox activity targeted businesses and individuals across Asia, including Taiwan, Japan, and Southeast Asia, and expanded to medical institutions, financial companies, and corporate environments. Catena was used alongside other tooling to establish persistence, communicate with remote servers, and support movement within compromised networks. High-confidence related artifacts from the observed Catena-style chain include WavesSvc64.exe, DuiLib_u.dll, encrypted shellcode container box.ini, and the scheduled task Batteries.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
After gaining initial entry through phishing, the attackers deploy a range of malware tools including ValleyRAT, AtlasCross RAT, and the Catena loader.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A loader used by Silver Fox as part of the post-phishing infection chain to deliver and support additional malware used for persistence and network compromise.
Loader pattern where legitimate-looking executables bundle encrypted attack code in configuration files (e.g., .ini) and use reflective/in-memory execution to reduce forensic footprint; referenced here as matching the observed ValleyRAT delivery chain.
Memory-resident multi-stage loader used to stage delivery of Winos 4.0 via fake installers.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.