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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

VK Styles

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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2vk

The large-scale campaign has been codenamed VK Styles. The malware embedded in the extensions is designed to engage in active account manipulation by automatically subscribing users to the attacker's VK groups... manipulating Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) tokens... and maintaining persistent control.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1072Software Deployment ToolsEvidence1

"The extensions updated automatically and silently, meaning the attacker could push new malicious code with no user interaction required."

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"marketed as a way to scrape Meta Business Suite data..."; "extensions masquerading as VK customization tools"; "advertised as artificial intelligence (AI) assistants"

Persistence

1 technique
T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

"...active account manipulation by automatically subscribing users to the attacker's VK groups, resetting account settings every 30 days to override user preferences..."

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

"...active account manipulation by automatically subscribing users to the attacker's VK groups, resetting account settings every 30 days to override user preferences..."

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"Present in the payload is obfuscated JavaScript that's injected into every VK page the victim visits."

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1072Software Deployment ToolsEvidence1

"The extensions updated automatically and silently, meaning the attacker could push new malicious code with no user interaction required."

Collection

1 technique
T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

"Target Business Manager 'People' view ... and build a CSV file with names, email addresses, roles and permissions..."; "Enumerate Business Manager-level entities and their linked assets and build a CSV file..."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

"...used VKontakte itself as part of the malware’s infrastructure, making the campaign harder to detect and block."

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app
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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.