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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

MESSYFORK

MESSYFORK (also referred to as COOKBOX) is malware used in Russia-linked operations targeting Ukraine’s defense/battlefield ecosystem. In reporting cited in the provided content, MESSYFORK was used for reconnaissance and malware delivery, including in campaigns attributed to UNC5125 (aka FlyingYeti/UAC-0149) that focused on frontline drone units and UAV operators. Delivery methods mentioned include lures via Google Forms-hosted questionnaires and distribution via messaging apps to a UAV operator. The content does not provide additional technical details on MESSYFORK’s internal capabilities beyond its role in reconnaissance and as a delivery mechanism, nor does it list specific indicators of compromise for this malware.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0149

"...distributed via messaging apps malware like MESSYFORK (aka COOKBOX) to an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operator..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
UNC5125

"...distributed via messaging apps malware like MESSYFORK (aka COOKBOX) to an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operator..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

“UNC5125 targeted frontline drone units with Google Forms lures…”

What this page doesn’t show

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.