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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

THINWAVE

THINWAVE is a backdoor associated with North Korean cyber activity, specifically attributed in the provided content to APT43 (Kimsuky). The reporting states that APT43 likely deployed THINWAVE using infrastructure that mimicked German and U.S. defense-related entities. It is described as part of North Korean operations targeting the defense industrial base, including defense-sector organizations in South Korea and broader aerospace and defense targets in the United States and Europe. The surrounding campaign context indicates use of social engineering, infrastructure mimicry, and AI-assisted reconnaissance by North Korean actors. High-confidence details in the content identify THINWAVE only as a backdoor; no additional technical behavior, infection chain specifics, persistence mechanisms, command-and-control details, or indicators of compromise are provided.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

"APT43 (aka Kimsuky) ... deploy a backdoor called THINWAVE."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

APT45 (Andariel) , APT43 (Kimsuky) , and UNC2970 (Lazarus Group) from North Korea are leveraging social engineering, “Dream Job” campaigns... Iranian groups deploy... in Dream Job-style campaigns, often using resume and personality test apps as delivery vectors.

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Threat actor attribution1

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Exploited vulnerabilities

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Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

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Researcher chatter

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