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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

SimpleWriter_

SimpleWriter_ is a malicious NuGet package used in a software supply-chain campaign targeting ASP.NET web application developers. Published in August 2024 by the account "hamzazaheer" as one of four related packages alongside NCryptYo, DOMOAuth2_, and IRAOAuth2.0, it accumulated part of the campaign’s roughly 4,500 downloads before takedown. It presents itself as a PDF conversion utility, but analysis shows it provides unconditional file-writing capability and hidden process execution. The package registers via dependency injection using AddWriterService to add ISimpleWriter/SimpleWriterService, beacons to https://localhost:7152/api/auth/ValidateWriterPermsAuthCheckProcessHandlerVerify, suppresses HttpRequestException, and discards the response. It executes ExternalLib\Windows\wkhtmltopdf.exe with CreateNoWindow=true while redirecting stdout and stderr; reporting indicates this binary is expected to be dropped by the companion package NCryptYo. The broader campaign was designed to compromise applications built with the malicious dependencies rather than directly targeting developer workstations. NCryptYo acts as an obfuscated stage-1 dropper that installs JIT hooks, decrypts embedded payloads, and deploys a localhost proxy on 127.0.0.1:7152, while DOMOAuth2_ and IRAOAuth2.0 exfiltrate ASP.NET Identity data such as user accounts, role assignments, and permission mappings through that proxy to attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure. The C2 can return authorization rules that enable persistent backdoors in deployed applications, including granting admin roles, modifying access controls, or disabling security checks. Analysis cited identical build environments, shared embedded credentials, and metadata artifacts across the packages, indicating common authorship by a single threat actor.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
hamzazaheer

"SimpleWriter_ adds unconditional file writing and hidden process execution to the toolkit."

via socket blogsocket.dev
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence2

"Four malicious NuGet packages have been discovered targeting ASP.NET web application developers... The packages... were published to the NuGet repository... These packages aimed to compromise applications during the development phase, allowing attackers to gain access to deployed production environments"

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

"Socket's Threat Research Team discovered a NuGet supply chain attack involving four malicious packages... The lead package NCryptYo masquerades as a cryptography library through deliberate typosquatting of the legitimate NCrypto package."

Stealth

1 technique
T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence2

"and hidden process execution, masquerading as a PDF utility"

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"the package sends HTTP POST requests to https://localhost:7152/api/auth/... Every request includes the hardcoded auth token in an HTTP header."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“SimpleWriter_… writes threat actor-controlled files to disk”

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

"deploy a stage-2 binary - a localhost proxy on port 7152 that relays traffic... to the attacker's external C2 server"

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

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