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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

BurrowShell

BurrowShell is a custom x64 shellcode-based backdoor (full-featured implant) used in cyber-espionage activity attributed with moderate confidence by Arctic Wolf to the India-nexus threat actor SloppyLemming (aka Outrider Tiger / Fishing Elephant). It was observed in campaigns targeting government entities and critical infrastructure operators in Pakistan and Bangladesh (with related reporting also referencing Sri Lanka) during roughly January 2025–January 2026.

Delivery/execution (observed):

  • Spear-phishing using malicious PDF lures and macro-enabled Excel documents.
  • A primary chain used PDF decoys containing embedded URLs that redirected victims to ClickOnce application manifests.
  • ClickOnce delivered a legitimate Microsoft .NET runtime executable (NGenTask.exe) renamed to OneDrive.exe and a malicious loader DLL (mscorsvc.dll). Execution was achieved via DLL side-loading / DLL search order hijacking.
  • The loader RC4-decrypted an encrypted payload blob (e.g., system32.dll) using a hardcoded 32-character key and executed BurrowShell in-memory as x64 shellcode.
  • The loader established persistence via a Run key entry under Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for the renamed legitimate executable.

Capabilities (as described in reporting):

  • File system manipulation / file operations.
  • Remote shell / command execution.
  • Screenshot capture.
  • Network tunneling via SOCKS proxy.
  • Defense evasion/analysis resistance: dynamic Windows API resolution via hashing of exported function names.

Command-and-control (as described in reporting):

  • Uses WinHTTP over HTTPS and masquerades traffic as Windows Update, including a Windows-Update-Agent/10.0.10011.Client-Protocol/2.50 User-Agent.
  • Communicates with Cloudflare Workers-hosted infrastructure (e.g., www[.]gov-pk[.]workers[.]dev:443) and uses RC4-protected payloads.
  • Reported HTTP paths include /beta/deviceManagement/managedDevices (registration), /v10/WindowsUpdate/ClientWebService/ClientService.asmx/SyncUpdates (heartbeats), and an internal “OneCollector” status mechanism posting to /OneCollector/1.0/.

Associated infrastructure/IOCs explicitly mentioned in the content:

  • Example lure URL: hxxps://webmail-pnra[.]gov-pk[.]workers[.]dev/ftp[.]pnra.org.application
  • C2 domain: www[.]gov-pk[.]workers[.]dev
  • Example file hashes tied to the BurrowShell delivery chain: PDF lure SHA-256 8faeea306a331d86ce1acb92c8028b4322efbd11a971379ba81a6b769ff5ac4b; OneDrive.exe (renamed NGenTask.exe) SHA-256 9fd133b11abcbbed33ccea71bd4743e8f35e42cd637fb763f5ab2a8fbb9b6261; loader mscorsvc.dll SHA-256 81d1a62c00724c1dfbc05a79ac4ae921c459350a2a4a93366c0842fadc40b011; encrypted payload blob system32.dll SHA-256 3dbf64da37616acbe16bc6bd06a320fed416c4c8ec37a04f811a32389af3d46c.
  • RC4 key for BurrowShell payload decryption (as reported): boikztaigkuneapfvpesuabfmpxgwnad.

Targeting noted in the content includes Pakistani nuclear regulatory bodies, defense logistics, and telecommunications infrastructure, and Bangladeshi energy utilities and financial institutions, consistent with an intelligence-collection objective.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
SloppyLemming

SloppyLemming Deploys BurrowShell and Rust-Based RAT to Target Pakistan and Bangladesh

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
Outrider Tiger

"...delivery of a malicious PDF holding malware known as BurrowShell — a backdoor that allows hackers to take screenshots and manipulate a file system."

via the record mediatherecord.media
Fishing Elephant

"...executed a custom x64 shellcode implant that Arctic Wolf has named BurrowShell. BurrowShell is a full-featured backdoor providing the threat actor with file system manipulation, screenshot capture capabilities, remote shell execution, and SOCKS proxy capabilities for network tunneling."

via arctic wolf blogarcticwolf.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence2

"...continued exploitation of Cloudflare Workers infrastructure with government-themed typo-squatting patterns..."

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

“Two custom implants were identified – an in-memory x64 shellcode (BurrowShell)… The second implant is a Rust-based keylogger…”

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

"One chain utilized spear-phishing emails containing PDF lures and macro-enabled Excel documents."

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“PDF documents containing embedded malicious URLs that redirect victims to ClickOnce application manifest files…”

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

"...macro-enabled Excel documents" and "Excel documents with malicious macros"

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3
TacticExecution

"These led victims to ClickOnce application manifests that deployed a malicious loader"

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

“Victims must click “Download file” button in PDF or enable macros in Excel.”

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“Persistence establishment: … creating a registry entry under Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“Persistence establishment: … creating a registry entry under Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1
TacticStealth

“system32.dll (Encrypted Shellcode Payload)… an RC4-encrypted blob containing the final payload.”

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
TacticStealth

“DLLs named mscorsvc.dll, sppc.dll, system32.dll to appear legitimate.”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

"...employs RC4 encryption with a 32-character key for payload protection."

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

“PDF lure documents… redirected victims to ClickOnce application manifests…”

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence2
TacticStealth

"...led victims to ClickOnce application manifests that deployed a malicious loader"

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“collects basic host and process metadata…”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“collects basic host and process metadata… gathers system information via Windows APIs”

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

“ls/dir List directory contents… Lists files/directories via FindFirstFileA & FindNextFileA.”

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

"...BurrowShell, a full-featured backdoor capable of file manipulation, remote shell execution..."

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

"...providing the threat actor with file system manipulation, screenshot capture capabilities..."

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

“download… Base64-encodes contents, sends to C2… screenshot… Base64 encodes BMP data”

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"The implant masquerades its command-and-control (C2) traffic as Windows Update service communications..."

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“initiates an outbound HTTPS connection… using the WinHTTP API… transmitted via HTTP POST…”

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

“can activate SOCKS-based tunneling… command set: socks_connect / socks_data / socks_close”

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

"...SOCKS proxy capabilities for network tunneling..."

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

“campaign leverages 112 unique Cloudflare Workers domains… for both payload delivery and C2 communication.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"...deployed a malicious loader, which in turn executed BurrowShell"

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

“C2 communication over port 443 mimicking legitimate HTTPS.”

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

"...BurrowShell...capable of...network tunneling."

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“establishes an outbound HTTPS connection… TLS-encrypted C2 communications.”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“download Exfiltrate file… sends to C2… screenshot… sends to C2.”

Impact

1 technique
T1565.001Stored Data ManipulationEvidence1
TacticImpact

"...capable of file manipulation..."

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Threat actor attribution3

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Exploited vulnerabilities

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Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping30

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

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