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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

SALATSTEALER

SalatStealer is a Go-based Windows malware family, often described as a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) stealer, that combines broad information-stealing functionality with full remote-access trojan capabilities. Multiple reports describe it as a PE32 executable, frequently UPX-packed or using fake UPX section names, with encrypted configuration data and runtime C2 resolution. It has been linked to the NyashTeam/WebRat operation, a Russian-speaking MaaS group active since at least 2022, which marketed the malware via nyash[.]team and Telegram channels and used infrastructure including salat[.]cn, salator[.]es, websalat[.]top, sa1at[.]ru, wrat[.]in, webrat[.]ru, and webrat[.]top. Backend infrastructure was observed on Beget LLC-hosted servers in Russia, including 85.198.98.75 and 217.26.28.234, and additional linked infrastructure included 85.117.234.216 and 157.22.174.200.

SalatStealer targets browser credentials, cookies, login databases, web data, local state files, authentication tokens, browser sessions, and cryptocurrency wallets. Reported targeting includes more than 28-30 Chromium-based browsers, 6+ Gecko-based browsers, more than 24-28 cryptocurrency wallet applications, and 62 Chrome extension IDs associated with wallet extensions. Named targets include Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, Yandex, Chromium, Firefox, Waterfox, SeaMonkey, Thunderbird, MetaMask, Phantom, Electrum, Coinbase, Binance Wallet, TonKeeper, MyTonWallet, AtomicWallet, Jaxx Liberty, TerraStation, Trust Wallet, Coinomi, and MyMonero. It also steals Telegram Desktop tdata, Discord tokens, Steam files such as config.vdf and SteamTokens.txt, clipboard contents including cryptocurrency addresses and tg:// URLs, screenshots, and keylogger output.

Beyond infostealing, SalatStealer includes extensive RAT functionality. Reported capabilities include arbitrary command execution, interactive reverse shell access, screen capture and streaming, desktop recording, webcam capture, microphone capture, hidden desktop interaction, keylogging, file download, process control, task scheduling, SOCKS5 or P2P proxying, persistence, and self-deletion. Persistence has been observed via a Registry Run key under SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and one campaign specifically used a Run value named WindowsUpdateService pointing to %TMP%\svchost.exe. The malware also includes privilege escalation and credential-access features such as LSASS targeting, token theft, privilege adjustment, COM elevation abuse, DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID, getSystemToken, NtQuerySystemHandles, and process unlocking via the Restart Manager API. It has been reported to abuse IElevator, IElevatorBrave, and IElevatorEdge COM interfaces to bypass Chromium App-Bound Encryption and decrypt browser secrets.

Its command-and-control design is intended to complicate detection and disruption. Reports state that SalatStealer encrypts its C2 domain in the binary and decrypts it at runtime, resolves infrastructure through DNS-over-HTTPS using Cloudflare, Google DNS, and 1.1.1.1 with fallback to the local resolver, and communicates over WebSocket on the /saat/ path over HTTPS with QUIC/HTTP3 support. A newer sample, yesamsevo.exe (SHA-256 8651bf3f8f38d547530e0dcdd89da904e14ee7bd87c05f5ff429038ba73013ef), added a previously undocumented mechanism to resolve its primary C2 through TON blockchain DNS using tonutils-go, with periodic re-resolution to support infrastructure rotation. Reported command strings include postOpen, /config, _gateway, shutdown, taskkill, and ConnectCache.

Observed delivery vectors vary by campaign. SalatStealer has been delivered through ClickFix-style social engineering using a fake Google Meet lure, where attackers relied on user-assisted execution and abused PowerShell and BITSAdmin rather than software exploitation; associated indicators included online-meet.com, 185.213.240.179, SHA-256 a7962ffda8cc0277c013ffd4bd4328e31aea8206b8379a0b574e05a5e5152812, and SHA-256 8a132e7dd4876c87b5c425db32291bd54a2f3a477c78ceb4d29f297867a150fa. It was also delivered in phishing campaigns targeting Ukrainian-speaking organizations via ZIP archives containing malicious LNK files that launched hidden PowerShell and fetched second-stage scripts from 195.10.205[.]65. CERT-UA reported SalatStealer use in UAC-0252 campaigns impersonating Ukrainian authorities and government institutions, including delivery via GitHub-hosted payloads and exploitation of the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2025-8088 alongside SHADOWSNIFF and DEAFTICK. Related indicators from CERT-UA include main.exe SHA-256 c149a236ddf07fb96de1a893b8d09cdfdd2c28abfc4c3c17bb3ebd8c3c7b5cef, main.deupx.exe SHA-256 a4f1a6f8f5a407ea0113253b557a6dc75c35398edf21bbc5322c47ac1fd0b689, and network paths such as hXXps://salat[.]cn/sa1at/ and hXXps://salator[.]ru/sa1at/.

SalatStealer also appeared repeatedly as a payload in the Amadey botnet campaign tagged fbf543, which multiple analyses assessed as a pay-per-install distribution service. In that campaign, Amadey distributed more than 50-100 samples across 24 malware families, including Vidar, LummaStealer, QuasarRAT, XWorm, SantaStealer, RustyStealer, and SalatStealer, using infrastructure such as sys32[.]cc, qpgroup[.]top, and labinstalls[.]info at 158.94.211.222. Additional reporting noted that large trojanized-software campaigns using WinUpdateHelper.dll also delivered SalatStealer in some infections, alongside coin miners and Mesh Agent.

High-confidence sample hashes reported for SalatStealer include 8651bf3f8f38d547530e0dcdd89da904e14ee7bd87c05f5ff429038ba73013ef, ec2e071a6241ac4d12452070c37ffde5bd01650c6d9a5503d768cb583fea6756, 30a50cc0f7b317c9734e6792e7e4ec174035d92031bdcc87a80ad8826adc60b2, c149a236ddf07fb96de1a893b8d09cdfdd2c28abfc4c3c17bb3ebd8c3c7b5cef, and a4f1a6f8f5a407ea0113253b557a6dc75c35398edf21bbc5322c47ac1fd0b689. Overall, the reporting consistently characterizes SalatStealer as a commodity but feature-rich infostealer/RAT used in financially motivated campaigns, with notable use against Ukrainian targets and infrastructure overlaps pointing to Russian-speaking criminal operators.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2025-8088WinRAR Windows Path Traversal via NTFS Alternate Data StreamsExploited in the wild

UAC-0252 Campaign (Jan--Feb 2026) SalatStealer was deployed alongside three other tools in a campaign targeting Ukraine, tracked as UAC-0252 ... Initial vector: CVE-2025-8088 (WinRAR path traversal) distributed via the PalachPro Telegram channel. | A fresh SalatStealer sample ( yesamsevo.exe ) ships with a previously undocumented capability: resolving its C2 server address via TON blockchain DNS using tonutils-go.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2025-12596Buffer Overflow in Tenda AC23 saveParentControlInfo

NyashTeam has been distributing SalatStealer through 15+ fake CVE proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub: ... github[.]com/DExplo1ted/CVE-2025-12596-Exploit

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2025-55234Windows SMB Server Relay-Based Elevation of Privilege

NyashTeam has been distributing SalatStealer through 15+ fake CVE proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub: ... github[.]com/h4xnz/CVE-2025-55234-POC

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
CVE-2025-10294Authentication Bypass in OwnID Passwordless Login for WordPress

Campaign Context Distribution via Fake CVE PoCs (NyashTeam, Dec 2025 -- present) NyashTeam has been distributing SalatStealer through 15+ fake CVE proof-of-concept repositories on GitHub: github[.]com/RedFoxNxploits/CVE-2025-10294-Poc github[.]com/FixingPhantom/CVE-2025-10294

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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NyashTeam

A fresh SalatStealer sample ( yesamsevo.exe ) ships with a previously undocumented capability: resolving its C2 server address via TON blockchain DNS using tonutils-go.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
UAC-0252

UAC-0252 EXE in archive (SalatStealer) Weak, different delivery entirely

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

39 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Cracked software download links

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

This campaign demonstrates how ClickFix-style social engineering continues to evolve through abuse of legitimate Windows tooling and user-assisted execution workflows.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Modify Registry T1112 Registry Run key persistence, Defender exclusion bypass

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation ... Process Injection T1055 WriteProcessMemory , SetWindowsHookEx

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On execution: mutex check ( checkDupe ), UAC bypass ( Elevate ), persistence via registry Run key and Task Scheduler...

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

Privilege Escalation main.Elevate -- UAC bypass ... Collection hits ... then privilege escalation through IElevator COM, token duplication, and LSASS handle enumeration.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation ... Process Injection T1055 WriteProcessMemory , SetWindowsHookEx

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

Cleanup via selfDelete() and remote Suicide() command.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

main.DuplicateUserTokenFromSessionID -- WTS token duplication main.getSystemToken -- SYSTEM token acquisition

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 VirtualBox/VMware registry key checks, ACPI enumeration

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Modify Registry T1112 Registry Run key persistence, Defender exclusion bypass

Credential Access

8 techniques
T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

main.NtQuerySystemHandles -- Handle enumeration (LSASS targeting) main.findLsassProcess -- LSASS process location

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

main.runKeylogger -- Start capture main.keyPressCallback -- SetWindowsHookEx WH_KEYBOARD callback main.windowChangeCallback -- Active window change (context labeling)

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Collection hits 34 browsers, 28 crypto wallets, Telegram/Discord/Steam tokens, keylogger with window context, screenshots, and clipboard.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

The malware’s extensive browser and cryptocurrency wallet targeting highlights the continued operational focus on credential theft, session hijacking, and digital asset compromise.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Credentials in Files T1552.001 Browser profile data, wallet files

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The malware’s extensive browser and cryptocurrency wallet targeting highlights the continued operational focus on credential theft, session hijacking, and digital asset compromise.

T1555.001KeychainEvidence1

Firefox gets parallel treatment through NSS master key derivation with ASN.1 PBE parsing, 3DES and AES decryption paths, and proper PKCS5 unpadding.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Chromium-based browsers get the full treatment: DPAPI master key decryption, AES-GCM cookie/password decryption, and -- critically -- a GetAppBoundKey function that bypasses Chrome v127+'s App-Bound Encryption via the IElevator COM interface.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Process Discovery T1057 PROCESSENTRY32 enumeration

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation System Information Discovery T1082 Win32_Processor , Win32_LogonSession , HWID

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 VirtualBox/VMware registry key checks, ACPI enumeration

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The bc.exe filename observed in a second Triage submission suggests the binary is distributed under different names to affiliates. System language and location discovery TTPs in that submission indicate geo-targeting or geo-fencing behavior.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The bc.exe filename observed in a second Triage submission suggests the binary is distributed under different names to affiliates. System language and location discovery TTPs in that submission indicate geo-targeting or geo-fencing behavior.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Implementation ... Data from Local System T1005 Wallet files, Telegram tdata, Steam configs

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

main.runKeylogger -- Start capture main.keyPressCallback -- SetWindowsHookEx WH_KEYBOARD callback main.windowChangeCallback -- Active window change (context labeling)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

main.(*wsSess).ffdesktop -- Real-time screen streaming via ffmpeg

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

Collection hits 34 browsers, 28 crypto wallets, Telegram/Discord/Steam tokens, keylogger with window context, screenshots, and clipboard.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Capability Functions Method ... Microphone ffwmic , getMics ffmpeg

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

main.(*wsSess).ffwcam -- Webcam capture

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The transport layer uses gorilla/websocket over HTTPS with QUIC/HTTP3 support (via quic-go). The C2 path is /saat/ with a WebSocket session protocol ( wsSess ) for bidirectional command execution.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence3

Every infected host becomes a SOCKS5 proxy node: main.(*socks5Conn).Serve -- SOCKS5 server ... main.p2pSocks -- P2P SOCKS relay

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The actual C2 connection uses WebSocket over TLS for command-and-control, and QUIC (HTTP/3) for bulk data exfiltration.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

the threat actor leverages PowerShell, BITSAdmin, and lightweight obfuscation techniques to stage and deploy SalatStealer

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

SalatStealer has been documented before ... The binary imports github.com/xssnick/tonutils-go v1.16.0 and implements two functions: main.tonResolve and main.tryTonResolve.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

A tloop function implements a polling loop that periodically re-resolves via TON, meaning the operator can rotate infrastructure mid-campaign and all infected hosts will follow within one polling interval. This is Fast Flux DNS with the blockchain as the authoritative server.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

The actual C2 connection uses WebSocket over TLS for command-and-control...

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Exfiltration compresses to sent.zip , ships over WSS and QUIC.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

39 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
23 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
15 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app13 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app13 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching39

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping39

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.