MalwareUsed by 1 actor

EVILSCHOLAR

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Chernovite

“EVILSCHOLAR: A capability designed to discover, access, manipulate, and disable Schneider Electric PLCs. It contains a CODESYS library that potentially allows it to target other vendors’ devices.”

via cyberscoopcdn.cyberscoop.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Stealth

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Unauthorized Login … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1078 Valid Accounts” and narrative: “...gather credentials to access a legitimate account...”

Credential Access

1 technique

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

“EVILSCHOLAR Password Brute Force Attempt … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1110 Brute Force” and “MOUSEHOLE … brute forcing credentials.”

Discovery

1 technique

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

“MOUSEHOLE Scan for Devices … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1046 Network Service Scanning” and “...rapid reconnaissance of ICS networks... port numbers, HTTP banners, FINS, Modbus, NetManage.”

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

cyberscoopNews

Mar 3, 2026

PIPEDREAM component focused on Schneider Electric PLC discovery and manipulation/disablement. Uses/embeds CODESYS-related functionality and supports actions such as password brute forcing and denial-of-service against controllers.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.