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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Darkcomp

Darkcomp is a backdoor malware family linked in public reporting to the Iranian threat actor Seedworm, also known as MuddyWater. Multiple sources in the provided content state that Google, Microsoft, and Kaspersky linked Darkcomp to Seedworm, and that the malware was signed in some cases with the code-signing certificate issued to “Donald Gay.” Darkcomp is also described as being delivered by the Stagecomp downloader, with several reports explicitly stating that Stagecomp is designed to deploy or download the Darkcomp backdoor.

In the intrusion activity described by Rapid7, attackers assessed with medium/moderate confidence to be MuddyWater used valid credentials obtained through Microsoft Teams-based social engineering and phishing, then used RDP and curl to deploy payloads that included Darkcomp, a malicious Microsoft WebView2 loader intended to disguise traffic, and an encrypted configuration file that sent instructions to Darkcomp. The broader campaign involved credential harvesting, MFA manipulation, remote access via tools such as AnyDesk and DWAgent, lateral movement using compromised accounts, and theft of sensitive data. Rapid7 assessed that the operation was disguised as a Chaos ransomware incident to conceal espionage activity or preposition for possible future destructive attacks.

The content also places Darkcomp within a broader MuddyWater malware ecosystem that includes Stagecomp, Dindoor, and Fakeset, and notes reporting tying these malware families to targeting of U.S. entities. High-confidence details directly supported by the content are that Darkcomp is a backdoor, that Stagecomp delivers/downloads it, that the “Donald Gay” certificate was previously used to sign Darkcomp-related malware, and that the malware has been associated with Seedworm/MuddyWater in reporting by Google, Microsoft, Kaspersky, Broadcom/Symantec, PolySwarm, and Rapid7.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater

По данным Broadcom, сертификат «Donald Gay» ранее использовался для подписи малвари, предположительно связываемой с Seedworm [названия Stagecomp/Darkcomp требуют верификации по первоисточнику Broadcom].

via codebycodeby.net
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Investigators found that the group deployed undocumented malware to establish persistent footholds inside victim environments.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Investigators found that the group deployed undocumented malware to establish persistent footholds inside victim environments.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence2

“This backdoor was signed with a certificate issued to ‘Amy Cherne’… Fakeset… was signed by certificates issued to ‘Amy Cherne’ and ‘Donald Gay’… used previously to sign malware linked to Seedworm.”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Armed with valid credentials, the attackers then executed various commands via RDP, which downloaded payloads using curl. These payloads included a backdoor malware dubbed Darkcomp, a malicious Microsoft WebView2 loader...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
7 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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IOC matching11

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.