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Malware

RedAlert.apk

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

This campaign weaponizes a legitimate-looking Android package (APK) to deliver mobile surveillance and data-exfiltrating malware.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

Unit 42 has identified an active phishing campaign using a malicious replica of the Israeli Home Front Command RedAlert application... Figure 10. SMS phishing message to download malicious RedAlert application.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"Attackers sent smishing messages urging recipients to download what appeared to be an urgent wartime update... this campaign forced victims to sideload the malicious APK"

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"Stage 2 extracts a hidden file named 'umgdn' — stored without a file extension inside the APK’s assets directory — and loads it into memory as a Dalvik Executable"

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

"threat actors crafted a trojanized version of Israel’s official 'Red Alert' emergency app... once installed, the fake app displayed a fully working alert interface identical to the official one"

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"transmitted to attacker-controlled servers through HTTP POST requests directed at https://api[.]ra-backup[.]com/analytics/submit.php"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"Attackers sent smishing messages urging recipients to download... RedAlert.apk"

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

"Harvested data was staged locally before being transmitted to attacker-controlled servers through HTTP POST requests"

What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.