GhostClaw
GhostClaw is a macOS-focused malware campaign and associated malware family targeting developers through software supply chain and social-engineering techniques. It was documented by JFrog Security Research in early March 2026 as GhostClaw/GhostLoader and later analyzed by Jamf Threat Labs, which identified at least eight related samples. The campaign initially spread via malicious npm packages and expanded to fake GitHub repositories impersonating trading bots, SDKs, developer utilities, and AI “skills.” It also abuses AI-assisted development workflows by using SKILL.md-based installation paths that can cause coding agents to execute malicious actions automatically, in addition to README instructions that direct victims to run shell commands such as curl-based installers.
Observed execution begins with an install.sh bootstrapper that checks macOS version and architecture, silently installs a compatible Node.js runtime in a user-controlled directory without elevated privileges, and downloads components using curl with -k/--insecure. Execution then passes to heavily obfuscated JavaScript payloads including setup.js and postinstall.js. These stages clear the terminal, display fake installation progress to mimic legitimate SDK or package installation, and prompt the user for credentials. GhostClaw validates supplied passwords using the native macOS command dscl with -authonly, and uses osascript/AppleScript dialogs designed to resemble legitimate macOS security prompts. The malware may attempt to obtain Full Disk Access by directing the user to the relevant macOS settings pane.
After credential collection, GhostClaw contacts the command-and-control domain trackpipe[.]dev to retrieve an encrypted secondary payload associated with GhostLoader. The payload is decrypted locally, written to a temporary path such as /tmp/sys-opt-{random}.js, executed as a detached process, and then removed. Persistence has been observed via placement under ~/.cache/.npm_telemetry/monitor.js to resemble normal npm telemetry activity. Reported objectives include stealing macOS credentials, harvesting sensitive data, and deploying a remote access trojan capable of stealing cryptocurrency wallets and receiving remote commands.
The campaign targets macOS users, especially developers who install tools from public registries or GitHub and those using AI-assisted coding workflows. Related reporting noted ties or similarities to activity referred to as the Ghost campaign, GhostLoader, Glassworm, and PolinRider. High-confidence indicators mentioned in the reporting include the C2 domain trackpipe[.]dev, temporary payload paths matching /tmp/sys-opt-{random}.js, persistence at ~/.cache/.npm_telemetry/monitor.js, and campaign UUIDs e713b5cc-fde6-486f-a951-4147dd618510, ae1e1f14-89a7-4ab7-86bc-5e9ee95a3bfb, e4db7e70-bb94-44a2-8ea0-f1959971eb35, b4c2cb0e-65e1-4626-b52c-5ce24cbe8d48, e6f1f054-694b-4648-9a70-9186c82c3792, and 77176253-b60e-4b30-b343-d90f4182a727, as well as NODE_CHANNEL values anglmf and cryptoexth4.
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Techniques & procedures
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
Jamf Threat Labs exposes new GhostClaw/GhostLoader samples using malicious GitHub repos and AI dev workflows to steal macOS credentials via multi-stage payloads.
The malware was distributed through malicious npm packages, targeting developers who routinely install tools from public package registries. The campaign quickly spread beyond the npm ecosystem and into GitHub-hosted repositories that impersonated trading bots, software development kits, and other common developer utilities.
the repositories contain a README with step-by-step installation instructions that encourage users to execute a shell command, typically using curl to retrieve and run a remote script.
A new malware campaign called GhostClaw is actively targeting macOS users through fake GitHub repositories and AI-assisted development workflows. The campaign uses social engineering disguised as legitimate developer tools to steal user credentials and drop secondary payloads on infected systems.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
In one path, repositories contain README files with step-by-step installation instructions that prompt users to run a shell command using curl.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
Execution then passes to setup.js, a heavily obfuscated JavaScript file responsible for credential collection.
The process starts with install.sh, a bootstrapper script that presents itself as a routine setup tool... To avoid raising suspicion, the script clears the terminal and displays fake progress indicators that mimic a legitimate SDK installation.
Following execution, the temporary file is removed... Following execution of the primary payload, postinstall.js is invoked to extend the compromise and obscure earlier activity.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
These dialogs are designed to resemble macOS security prompts and instruct the user to grant access or provide credentials. Variants observed during analysis impersonate different applications, including developer tools and trading platforms, while maintaining consistent messaging around access to 'secure wallet and credential storage.'
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
IOCs tracked for this family
18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
GhostClaw is a macOS-focused malware campaign delivered via malicious npm packages and fake GitHub repositories impersonating developer tools. It uses social engineering and AI-agent-targeted SKILL.md files to trigger infection, installs Node.js without elevated privileges, steals user credentials by validating them with dscl, retrieves an encrypted secondary payload from C2 infrastructure, and establishes persistence under a path designed to resemble normal npm telemetry activity.
A remote access trojan delivered via malicious npm packages in a software supply chain campaign. It uses fake npm installation logs and sudo password phishing to deploy a final payload, then steals cryptocurrency wallets, harvests sensitive data, and accepts remote commands while maintaining stealthy persistence.
Remote Access Trojan (RAT) delivered to developers searching for 'OpenClaw', implying a trojanized/masquerading distribution to gain remote control of victim systems.
A macOS-focused malware family observed in malicious GitHub repositories and AI development workflow lures, using multi-stage payloads to steal credentials.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.