DoubleDonut
DoubleDonut is a two-stage Donut-based malware loader observed by Rapid7 in a large ClickFix campaign that used compromised legitimate WordPress websites to infect visitors, primarily on Windows systems. In this activity, attackers injected malicious JavaScript into WordPress sites or served it through WordPress admin-ajax endpoints, presenting a fake Cloudflare verification/CAPTCHA page that instructed users to paste a command into the Windows Run dialog. The resulting infection chain used PowerShell stagers to download shellcode such as cptch.bin and cptchbuild.bin, execute it in memory, and inject later stages into processes including svchost.exe. Rapid7 assessed that the campaign used the open-source Donut loader twice in sequence, referring to this component as “DoubleDonut” or the “DoubleDonut Loader.”
The campaign was described as active in this form since December 2025, with some supporting infrastructure dating to July/August 2025, and Rapid7 identified more than 250 compromised websites across at least 12 countries. DoubleDonut was used to deliver infostealer payloads including Vidar, a previously unnamed .NET stealer Rapid7 called Impure Stealer, and a newer C++ stealer dubbed VodkaStealer. The delivered payloads were capable of harvesting browser credentials, authentication cookies, cryptocurrency wallet data, and other sensitive information from infected devices. High-confidence infrastructure and infection-chain indicators mentioned in the reporting include 91.92.240[.]219, 178.16.53[.]70, 94.154.35[.]115, and later 172.94.9[.]187, along with shellcode filenames cptch.bin and cptchbuild.bin. The initial WordPress compromise vector was not confirmed, though weak administrator credentials and unpatched themes or plugins were cited as likely possibilities.
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Techniques & procedures
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Researchers say attackers compromise legitimate WordPress sites and inject malicious JavaScript designed to intercept visitors before they can access the site's content. Instead of silently redirecting users, the injected code presents a fake Cloudflare verification page...
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A loader used in the ClickFix malware distribution operation involving compromised WordPress sites; it is listed among payloads used to facilitate theft of sensitive data.
Loader used in the ClickFix campaign delivered through compromised WordPress sites to facilitate payload delivery of credential- and data-stealing malware.
Campaign-specific two-step loader chain built around Donut: first Donut shellcode loads a small downloader that acquires SeDebugPrivilege, downloads a second Donut shellcode, injects it into a native svchost.exe, and executes the final infostealer payload.
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Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.