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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

time_calibrator

time_calibrator is a malicious Rust crate published to crates.io that masqueraded as a time-related utility and was identified by Socket as one of five related malicious packages, alongside chrono_anchor, dnp3times, time_calibrators, and time-sync. The crates impersonated the legitimate service timeapi.io and used the lookalike domain timeapis[.]io for exfiltration. Its core behavior was credential and secret theft rather than legitimate time calibration functionality: the package attempted to collect sensitive data from developer environments, especially .env files, and exfiltrate the contents to threat actor-controlled infrastructure. The activity was assessed as likely conducted by a single threat actor based on shared infrastructure and exfiltration methodology across the crate set. The package was advertised as calibrating local time without relying on NTP, but the reported behavior indicates straightforward .env exfiltration. The malware did not establish persistence via services or scheduled tasks, but attempted repeated exfiltration whenever the malicious code was invoked in developer workstations or CI workflows, creating software supply-chain risk. Stolen .env contents could include API keys, tokens, and other secrets, potentially enabling downstream compromise of cloud services, databases, GitHub, and registry accounts. The crate was removed from crates.io. It was also observed as a dependency in the GitHub repository aestik6/Polymarket-crypto-5min-arbitrage-bot, which was referenced in reporting on the broader Contagious Trader cryptocurrency-themed malware campaign.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

aestik6/Polymarket-crypto-5min-arbitrage-bot ... depends on time_calibrator , one of several malicious infostealer crates disclosed by Kirill Boychenko of Socket

via kmseckmsec.uk
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

“…relies on the same infrastructure, including a lookalike domain, timeapis[.]io , that impersonates the legitimate… timeapi.io service.”

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

five malicious Rust crates silently exfiltrated .env secrets from CI pipelines... The subsequent injection of malicious code into Trivy VS Code extension versions 1.8.12 and 1.8.13 from Open VSX escalated impact significantly, converting the widely deployed security tool into an active exfiltration agent.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

“Socket’s Threat Research Team uncovered a coordinated supply chain campaign in the Rust ecosystem involving five malicious crates… Although the crates pose as local time utilities, their core behavior is credential and secret theft.”

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“Because the trigger is unconditional inside check_params() , any code path that validates parameters, including tests, can cause silent outbound traffic and secret leakage.”

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

“Although the crates pose as local time utilities… dnp3times typosquats the legitimate dnp3time crate… chrono_anchor fits a brandjacking pattern… The remaining packages… imitate harmless-sounding calibration utilities.”

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

five malicious Rust crates silently exfiltrated .env secrets from CI pipelines... Four crates exfiltrated .env files directly.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence2

"They attempt to collect sensitive data from developer environments, most notably .env files, and exfiltrate it to threat actor-controlled infrastructure."

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

“Finally, it… uploads the file referenced by ENV_FILE_PATH… In this crate, ENV_FILE_PATH resolves to .env …”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

"...transmit .env file data to the threat actors... exfiltrate it to threat actor-controlled infrastructure."

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching2

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.