Skip to main content
Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

Slopoly

Slopoly is a PowerShell-based backdoor and command-and-control client used by the financially motivated threat actor Hive0163 in Interlock ransomware intrusions. IBM X-Force reported it was deployed during the post-exploitation phase after initial access had already been established, including in an early-2026 ransomware attack where it maintained persistent access to a compromised server for more than a week and supported data exfiltration.

The malware was observed being deployed after ClickFix social engineering led to execution of PowerShell and delivery of NodeSnake; later stages of the intrusion also involved InterlockRAT, AzCopy, Advanced IP Scanner, and ultimately Interlock ransomware. Hive0163 is associated with extortion, large-scale data theft, NodeSnake, Interlock RAT, JunkFiction loader, and Interlock ransomware, and has also been linked to malvertising and initial access brokers TA569/SocGholish and TAG-124/KongTuke/LandUpdate808.

Slopoly was reportedly dropped under C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Runtime\ and established persistence via a scheduled task named "Runtime Broker." It collects system information, sends heartbeat beacons to its C2 infrastructure every 30 seconds, polls for commands every 50 seconds, executes commands through cmd.exe, and returns command output to the server. Reported capabilities also include downloading and executing EXE, DLL, or JavaScript payloads, changing beacon intervals, updating itself, and exiting. It maintained a rotating persistence.log file. One reported C2 domain was plurfestivalgalaxy[.]com, associated with 94.156.181[.]89; additional Hive0163-related C2 IPs reported in the content were 77.42.75[.]119, 23.227.203[.]123, and 172.86.68[.]64.

Researchers assessed Slopoly as likely developed with assistance from a large language model based on extensive comments, structured logging, error handling, clearly named variables, and an unused "Jitter" function. Although comments described it as a "Polymorphic C2 Persistence Client," IBM X-Force stated it is not truly polymorphic because it does not modify its own code at runtime; instead, a builder likely generates variants by changing configuration values such as beacon intervals, identifiers, mutex names, session IDs, C2 endpoints, and function names. The content characterizes Slopoly as not highly sophisticated, but as an example of AI-assisted malware development accelerating custom tooling for ransomware operations.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2026-20131Unauthenticated Root RCE in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Web InterfaceExploited in the wild

The Interlock ransomware gang has been exploiting a maximum severity remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Cisco's Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) software in zero-day attacks since late January. Cisco patched the security flaw (CVE-2026-20131) on March 4, warning that it could allow unauthenticated attackers to remotely execute arbitrary Java code as root on unpatched devices.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Hive0163

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a suspected artificial intelligence (AI)-generated malware codenamed Slopoly put to use by a financially motivated threat actor named Hive0163. In one ransomware attack observed by the company in early 2026, the threat actor was observed deploying Slopoly during the post-exploitation phase so as to maintain persistent access to the compromised server for more than a week.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The malware collects system information, executes commands remotely, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

Persistence is achieved by setting up a scheduled task called "Runtime Broker."

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

The malware collects system information, executes commands remotely, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4
TacticExecution

The attack in itself is said to have leveraged the ClickFix social engineering tactic to trick the victim into running a PowerShell command, which then downloads NodeSnake.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

The PowerShell script functions as a full-fledged backdoor that can beacon a heartbeat message containing system information to a C2 server every 30 seconds, poll for a new command every 50 seconds, execute it via "cmd.exe," and relay the results back to the server.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The malware collects system information, executes commands remotely, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

Persistence is achieved by setting up a scheduled task called "Runtime Broker."

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The malware collects system information, executes commands remotely, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

Persistence is achieved by setting up a scheduled task called "Runtime Broker."

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4
TacticDiscovery

The PowerShell script functions as a full-fledged backdoor that can beacon a heartbeat message containing system information to a C2 server every 30 seconds.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The attackers later deployed Slopoly and tools such as AzCopy and Advanced IP Scanner to expand access and move laterally within the network.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The attackers later deployed Slopoly and tools such as AzCopy and Advanced IP Scanner to expand access and move laterally within the network.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Slopoly was observed as a post‑exploitation backdoor introduced after initial access had already been established... to provide attackers with a quickly built, fit‑for‑purpose command‑and‑control client... From a technical standpoint, Slopoly is a relatively simple PowerShell‑based C2 client.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“Sending a heartbeat beacon every 30 seconds to /api/commands; Polling for commands every 50 seconds… Sending command output back to the C2 server”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

A first-stage component, NodeSnake, is designed to run shell commands, establish persistence, and retrieve and launch a wider malware framework referred to as Interlock RAT.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

This backdoor allowed attackers to maintain access to compromised servers for over a week, facilitating significant data exfiltration.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.