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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

ts-lint-builder

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

ts-lint-builder acts as a lynchpin for strengthening the DPRK attribution for the Contagious Trader campaign ... ts-lint-builder uses a vercel[.]app deployment for staging resources

via kmseckmsec.uk
Contagious Interview

ts-lint-builder acts as a lynchpin for strengthening the DPRK attribution for the Contagious Trader campaign ... ts-lint-builder uses a vercel[.]app deployment for staging resources

via kmseckmsec.uk
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

The npm malware is fairly consistent across repositories ... The table below shows a variety of trading bot repositories and their malicious npm dependencies.

Execution

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The infection chain is invoked by a postinstall script that executes /test.js , which invokes the malicious from_str() function.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The infection chain is invoked by a postinstall script that executes /test.js , which invokes the malicious from_str() function.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The infection chain is invoked by a postinstall script that executes /test.js , which invokes the malicious from_str() function.

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The following other trading themed repositories implement similar encoded exfiltration endpoint implementations ... Base64-encoded exfiltration endpoint ... Some trading bots utilise a really neat method to exfiltrate data with some good misdirection to evade a cursory glance.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The infection vector can vary: Direct exfiltration to HTTP endpoint ... Direct exfiltration to an actor-controlled database ... The Base64-encoded content is http://65.109.25[.]6:6000/api/polymarket-copytrading-bot-api-key/validate.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.