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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

Andariel Scheduled Task Malware

Andariel Scheduled Task Malware is a malware/loader associated with the DPRK Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) 3rd Bureau threat group Andariel, also tracked as Onyx Sleet and formerly as PLUTONIUM, DarkSeoul, Silent Chollima, and Stonefly/Clasiopa. It is explicitly referenced in a joint FBI-led Cybersecurity Advisory and corresponding YARA detection content as "Andariel Scheduled Task Malware" (including the rule name "Andariel_ScheduledTask_Loader"). Based on the advisory context, it is part of Andariel’s broader intrusion toolkit used in cyber espionage and related operations.

The surrounding reporting states Andariel commonly gains initial access by exploiting public-facing web servers using known vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell), and then deploys web shells for follow-on exploitation. The actors establish persistence using Scheduled Tasks, perform discovery, steal credentials with tools such as Mimikatz, escalate privileges, move laterally via SMB and RDP, and exfiltrate data using cloud services or tools such as PuTTY and WinSCP. The group also uses phishing with malicious LNK files and HTA scripts in ZIP archives. In this context, Andariel Scheduled Task Malware is associated with the persistence mechanism of Scheduled Tasks and likely functions as a loader or implant used after initial compromise.

The advisory attributes Andariel activity to long-running DPRK state-sponsored espionage and ransomware operations. Current targeting is focused on defense, aerospace, nuclear, and engineering organizations for theft of sensitive military information and intellectual property, with additional targeting of medical and energy sectors. Reported objectives include collection of contract specifications, bills of materials, project details, design drawings, and engineering documents supporting Pyongyang’s military and nuclear programs. The advisory also notes Andariel has funded espionage through ransomware operations against U.S. healthcare entities and has conducted ransomware and espionage against the same victim in close temporal proximity.

High-confidence behavioral context from the advisory indicates Andariel malware and related tooling support arbitrary command execution, keylogging, screenshots, file and directory listing, browser history retrieval, process snooping, tunneling/proxying, and uploading content to command-and-control infrastructure. The actors often disguise C2 within HTTP traffic, use dual-use tools such as 3Proxy, PLINK, Stunnel, AsyncRAT, Impacket, ORVX Web Shell, WSO web shell, ProcDump, PuTTY, WinRAR, WinSCP, and RDP Wrapper, and routinely pack late-stage tooling with VMProtect and Themida for anti-analysis and evasion. The content indicates that indicators of compromise exist in the source advisory, including hashes, user-agent strings, and YARA rules, but no specific IOC values for this malware sample are provided in the supplied content.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2021-44228Log4Shell

Over the last 15 years, the group has developed RATs, including the following... ▪ Andariel Scheduled Task Malware

via ic3 alertsic3.gov
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Andariel

...Andariel Scheduled Task Malware... (YARA: rule Andariel_ScheduledTask_Loader)

via cisa alertscisa.gov
Stonefly/Clasiopa

Over the last 15 years, the group has developed RATs, including the following... ▪ Andariel Scheduled Task Malware

via ic3 alertsic3.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

“These tools include functionality for executing arbitrary commands... and uploading content to command and control (C2) [T1587.001, T1587.004].”

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

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Researcher chatter

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