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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

m6699.exe

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Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DragonSpark

The Golang malware m6699.exe uses the Yaegi framework to interpret at runtime encoded Golang source code stored within the compiled binary, executing the code as if compiled.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“allocat[es] executable… heap memory… places the first-stage shellcode… and executes it.” / “ctypes… load the shellcode in memory and start a new thread”

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

“uses encoding and encryption to hinder static analysis… Base-64 decodes and then decrypts the shellcode… AES CBC…” / “double Base64-encoded string”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“allocat[es] executable… heap memory… places the first-stage shellcode… and executes it.” / “ctypes… load the shellcode in memory and start a new thread”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

“The malware first Base-64 decodes and then decrypts the shellcode.” / “decodes before passing… for execution.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

“uses the Yaegi framework to interpret at runtime encoded Golang source code stored within the compiled binary…”

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

“shellcode connects to a C2 server using the Windows Sockets 2 library… receives… second-stage shellcode and executes it.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“deployment of malware and tools hosted at attacker-controlled infrastructure.” / staging URLs for py.exe, m6699.exe, c.exe, go.exe

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
3 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.