FFmpeg
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
"...an argument runner ... was used to run a video recorder, likely FFmpeg, to capture audio and video."
Techniques & procedures
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Collection
2 techniquesSystemInfoManager — сбор данных о системе жертвы, в том числе снимков экранов; RemoteControlManager ... запись экранов ... Для трансляции экрана используется отдельный файл ffmpeg.exe
Generated datasets for salat stealer ffmpeg in attack range... The following datasets were collected during this attack simulation: Ffmpeg_event.log Path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1125/salat_stealer_ffmpeg/ffmpeg_event.log
Recent activity
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.