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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

BLACKNET-00

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Infrastructure Destruction Squad

A threat actor named Infrastructure Destruction Squad announced BLACKNET-00 via Telegram, a fully GUI-driven ransomware builder available for $500 that requires zero programming knowledge to operate.

via socradar blogsocradar.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

but extends into more sophisticated territory with DLL Hijacking (T1574.001). DLL hijacking, where a malicious library is placed in a path searched before the legitimate one

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

Stealth

3 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The platform’s Anti-VM and Anti-Sandbox detection is particularly telling... By refusing to execute in detected virtual environments (MITRE ATT&CK T1497), the payload actively degrades the quality of automated threat intelligence collection.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The delayed execution capability (T1497.003) targets the time-bound analysis windows of most sandbox deployments — typically two to five minutes of monitored execution.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

but extends into more sophisticated territory with DLL Hijacking (T1574.001). DLL hijacking, where a malicious library is placed in a path searched before the legitimate one

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The platform’s Anti-VM and Anti-Sandbox detection is particularly telling... By refusing to execute in detected virtual environments (MITRE ATT&CK T1497), the payload actively degrades the quality of automated threat intelligence collection.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The delayed execution capability (T1497.003) targets the time-bound analysis windows of most sandbox deployments — typically two to five minutes of monitored execution.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

BLACKNET-00 offers a multi-algorithm encryption suite: AES-256 for symmetric bulk file encryption, RSA for asymmetric key exchange... and ChaCha20 as an alternative stream cipher

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app
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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.