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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

Trivy infostealer

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TeamPCP

75 of the version tags were force-pushed to malicious commits containing a Python infostealer, which exfiltrated CI/CD secrets to attacker-controlled infrastructure... The malicious payload self-identified as a “TeamPCP Cloud stealer” and exfiltrated to a typosquatted domain, scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org.

via flareio blogflare.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

Aqua Security announced that the open-source Trivy project ... had been recently compromised through a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow. The threat actor TeamPCP reportedly stole CI/CD secrets, deleted trusted tags, and force-pushed malicious binaries ... along with poisoned GitHub Actions

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

These artifacts contained an infostealer capable of harvesting environment variables, cloud tokens, and SSH keys from build environments... designed to harvest SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes secrets, database credentials, environment variables, and other sensitive data.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

These artifacts contained an infostealer capable of harvesting environment variables, cloud tokens, and SSH keys from build environments.

Discovery

1 technique
T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence1

These artifacts contained an infostealer capable of harvesting environment variables, cloud tokens, and SSH keys from build environments.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The threat actor modified these workflows to execute malicious code during CI runs, enabling the collection of sensitive data such as repository secrets, environment variables, and tokens exposed during pipeline execution.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.