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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Fuery

Fuery is a Windows implant written in Go 1.20.1 and obfuscated with Garble. It was observed as a payload delivered by the Amadey botnet in campaign fbf543, including a sample masquerading as volunteers.exe. Analysis describes Fuery as using a novel structural obfuscation scheme that embeds Raft consensus protocol data structures such as AppendEntries, VoteRequest, VoteResponse, LogEntry, LogIndex, NodeID, and Term, along with VP8/VP9-related structures, to disguise its custom little-endian binary command-and-control protocol and hinder static analysis. Researchers linked this obfuscation framework to a related SmokeLoader variant compiled with the same Go 1.20.1 toolchain.

Fuery communicates using raw WinSock APIs rather than high-level HTTP/TLS libraries in one analyzed sample set, and supports broad implant functionality including process injection via thread context hijacking, host reconnaissance, file-system operations, anti-analysis checks, and access to the Windows certificate store. Reported anti-analysis features include Wine detection, timer and sleep-manipulation checks, a custom exception handler, SetErrorMode, SetConsoleCtrlHandler, a zeroed PE timestamp, and stripped build paths.

Separate infrastructure analysis identified Fuery command-and-control at laf.oahgsfwklg.top (178.16.54.79), with a server stack of nginx and PHP 7.4.33 using Laravel cookies and a panel named "Monkey." In that observed infrastructure, Fuery used POST requests to single-letter endpoints /t, /s, /c, /f, and /v, which returned base64-encoded encrypted blobs or empty responses. The malware downloaded libeay32.dll and ssleay32.dll corresponding to OpenSSL 1.0.1g, which enabled SMTP exfiltration via smtp.gmail.com over TCP port 465; sandbox traffic was observed to 209.85.202.108:465. One report states the binary contained 13 hardcoded domains, but only laf.oahgsfwklg.top resolved at the time, while the others returned NXDOMAIN.

Fuery has been associated with the operator alias "ingermany" in reporting that linked Fuery and SmokeLoader infrastructure through certificates, hosting history, and WHOIS/SOA artifacts, though attribution confidence is limited. It appeared among multiple malware families distributed in the Amadey fbf543 pay-per-install campaign, indicating use in financially motivated cybercrime operations rather than a single-purpose intrusion set.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Amadey

Fuery is a garble-obfuscated Go 1.20.1 implant dropped by the Amadey botnet (campaign fbf543) that uses Raft consensus protocol data structures as a novel obfuscation layer to disguise its custom binary C2 protocol.

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Initial Access Phishing / Loader delivery T1566 Dropped by Amadey botnet

Execution

1 technique
T1106Native APIEvidence1
TacticExecution

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Execution Native API T1106 LoadLibrary / GetProcAddress for all DLL resolution

Persistence

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Persistence Registry Run Keys T1547 RegOpenKeyExW / RegQueryValueExW capability

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

Process Injection via Thread Hijacking CreateToolhelp32Snapshot -> Process32FirstW/NextW -> OpenProcess -> SuspendThread -> GetThreadContext -> SetThreadContext -> ResumeThread This is the classic thread context hijacking chain (T1055.003).

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation T1134 GetTokenInformation

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Persistence Registry Run Keys T1547 RegOpenKeyExW / RegQueryValueExW capability

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

Novel Obfuscation: Raft Consensus Protocol Type Abuse ... The Go binaries use Raft consensus protocol type names as disguises for malware data structures ... to make the binary appear to be a legitimate distributed systems application during static analysis.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Software Packing T1027.002 Custom identifier obfuscation framework

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The PE version info populates every field with "volunteers", creating a thin disguise as a benign application. ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Match Legitimate Name T1036.005 volunteers.exe masquerade

T1055.003Thread Execution HijackingEvidence1

Process Injection via Thread Hijacking CreateToolhelp32Snapshot -> Process32FirstW/NextW -> OpenProcess -> SuspendThread -> GetThreadContext -> SetThreadContext -> ResumeThread This is the classic thread context hijacking chain (T1055.003).

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1
TacticStealth

The compile timestamp is zeroed -- a deliberate anti-forensics measure. ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Timestomp T1070.006 Zeroed PE compile timestamp

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation T1134 GetTokenInformation

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files T1140 Runtime config construction

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Discovery Query Registry T1012 RegOpenKeyExW, RegEnumKeyExW

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Discovery System Network Configuration T1016 GetAdaptersInfo, GetIfEntry

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Discovery System Owner/User Discovery T1033 GetUserNameExW

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Discovery Process Discovery T1057 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot / Process32FirstW

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Discovery System Information Discovery T1082 GetSystemInfo, RtlGetNtVersionNumbers

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Discovery File and Directory Discovery T1083 FindFirstFileW / FindNextFileW

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Collection Data from Local System T1005 ReadFile, CreateFileMappingW

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Command and Control Data Obfuscation T1001 Raft protocol framing

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Command and Control Application Layer Protocol T1071 Custom binary protocol over raw TCP

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

These DLLs enable the bot to exfiltrate data via smtp.gmail.com:465

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The Fuery bot downloads OpenSSL DLLs from its C2 for SMTP-based exfiltration: /fd/libeay32.dll ... /fd/ssleay32.dll

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Command and Control Encrypted Channel T1573 Custom encryption (no stdlib crypto)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 TransmitFile, WSASend

T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

These DLLs enable the bot to exfiltrate data via smtp.gmail.com:465 (observed in sandbox: TCP to 209.85.202.108:465).

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1
TacticImpact

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Impact Service Stop T1489 TerminateProcess

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
20 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
6 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching31

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping25

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Fuery | Mallory