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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

PromptMink

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Contagious Interview

The malware campaign has been codenamed PromptMink by ReversingLabs... While subsequent iterations came embedded with PromptMink in the form of a Node.js single executable application (SEA)... The evolution of the malware from a simple infostealer to a specialized multi-platform harvester targeting Windows, Linux, and macOS capable of dropping SSH backdoors and gathering entire projects...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Shifty Corsair

The malware campaign has been codenamed PromptMink by ReversingLabs... While subsequent iterations came embedded with PromptMink in the form of a Node.js single executable application (SEA)... The evolution of the malware from a simple infostealer to a specialized multi-platform harvester targeting Windows, Linux, and macOS capable of dropping SSH backdoors and gathering entire projects...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

Another technique uses typosquatting, where the names and descriptions mimic legitimate libraries.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence2

A malicious npm package campaign called PromptMink surfaced after being introduced into an open-source autonomous crypto trading project through a code commit... That commit added a package called @solana-launchpad/sdk as a dependency... it silently pulled in a second package named @validate-sdk/v2, which is the actual malicious payload.

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

The attack adopts a phased approach, where the first-layer packages do not contain any malicious code, but import second-layer packages that actually embed the nefarious functionality.

Persistence

1 technique
T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence2

On Linux-based systems, the malware plants the attacker’s public SSH key into the victim’s authorized keys file, creating a persistent backdoor that allows remote access even after the malicious package has been removed.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence2

On Linux-based systems, the malware plants the attacker’s public SSH key into the victim’s authorized keys file, creating a persistent backdoor that allows remote access even after the malicious package has been removed.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Early versions of the malware were obfuscated JavaScript-based stealers ... BlueVoyant researcher Curt Buchanan said ... from static Obfuscator.io encoding to dynamically rotating custom obfuscation.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This second package presents itself as a standard data validation tool while covertly collecting and sending sensitive credentials from the host environment to a remote attacker-controlled server.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

Early versions of the malware were obfuscated JavaScript-based stealers that scan the current working directory recursively for .env or .json files ... Since then, the attackers behind the breach have published a new npm package called "csec-crypto-utils" containing an "updated payload" that substitutes the RAT dropper for a data stealer that exfoliates AWS keys, GitHub tokens, and .npmrc configuration files.

Collection

2 techniques
T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Once the @validate-sdk/v2 package reaches a developer’s system, it begins scanning all directories for files that may contain sensitive information. It targets environment files, JSON configuration files, API keys, and anything related to cryptocurrency transactions or wallet access.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

Collected files are compressed and quietly sent to an attacker-controlled server... Later versions written in Rust went further, compressing and stealing entire project directories, including full source code.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Collected files are compressed and quietly sent to an attacker-controlled server. Earlier package versions relied on a base64-encoded URL to hide the destination, while later versions switched to a dedicated domain to make tracking harder.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Early versions of the malware were obfuscated JavaScript-based stealers that scan the current working directory recursively for .env or .json files and stage for exfiltration to a Vercel URL ("ipfs-url-validator.vercel.app").

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.