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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

LoadToBadXml

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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Void Banshee

LoadToBadXml is a .NET Trojan loader that is obfuscated using Eziriz .NET Reactor.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

This script uses PowerShell to download an additional script hosted on a compromised web server and executes the command using the PowerShell irm (Invoke-RestMethod) alias and iex (Invoke-Expression) alias commands.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then injects them into C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe. The malware employs a common process injection technique... CreateProcess ... VirtualAllocEx ... WriteProcessMemory ... CreateRemoteThread API.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The HTA file contains a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) that decrypts XOR encrypted content with key 4... LoadToBadXml is a .NET Trojan loader that is obfuscated using Eziriz .NET Reactor.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then injects them into C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe. The malware employs a common process injection technique... CreateProcess ... VirtualAllocEx ... WriteProcessMemory ... CreateRemoteThread API.

T1218.009Regsvcs/RegasmEvidence1
TacticStealth

Atlantida abuses RegAsm.exe to proxy malicious code execution.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.