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MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

SortVistaCompat

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2019-18935RCE in Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX RadAsyncUploadExploited in the wild

Filename SortVistaCompat Description Base64 encoded payload dropped from Multi-OS_ReverseShell.exe . This file receives the C2 IP and port from xework[.]com ... The two files xesmartshell.tmp and SortVistaCompat have the capability to drop an Active Server Pages (ASPX) webshell ... decoded as small.aspx. | Analysts determined that multiple cyber threat actors, including an advanced persistent threat (APT) actor, were able to exploit a .NET deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2019-18935) in Progress Telerik user interface (UI) for ASP.NET AJAX, located in the agency’s Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) web server. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows for remote code execution.

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
XE Group

Filename SortVistaCompat Description Base64 encoded payload dropped from Multi-OS_ReverseShell.exe . This file receives the C2 IP and port from xework[.]com ... The two files xesmartshell.tmp and SortVistaCompat have the capability to drop an Active Server Pages (ASPX) webshell ... decoded as small.aspx.

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

As early as August 2021, CISA and authoring organizations observed TA2 delivering malicious PNG files that, following analysis, were masqueraded DLL files to avoid detection [T1036.005].

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The two files xesmartshell.tmp and SortVistaCompat have the capability to drop an Active Server Pages (ASPX) webshell—a base64 encoded text file small.txt decoded [T1140] as small.aspx [T1505.003].

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

When exploiting the vulnerability, the threat actors uploaded malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) files (some masqueraded as portable network graphics [PNG] files) [T1105] to the C:\Windows\Temp\ directory.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.