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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

Beach Head

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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NSA

The documentation mentions United Rake, Peddle Cheap, Packet Wrench, and Beach Head—all delivered from a FOXACID subsystem called Ferret Cannon.

via the atlantictheatlantic.com
TAO

The documentation mentions United Rake, Peddle Cheap, Packet Wrench, and Beach Head — all delivered from a FOXACID subsystem called Ferret Cannon.

via web archiveweb.archive.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

By the time the NSA tricks a target into visiting one of those servers, it already knows exactly who that target is... Based on that information, the server can automatically decide what exploit to serve the target

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

By the time the NSA tricks a target into visiting one of those servers, it already knows exactly who that target is... the server can automatically decide what exploit to serve the target... If the target is a high-value one, FOXACID might run a rare zero-day exploit that it developed or purchased.

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2
TacticExecution

Based on that information, the server can automatically decide what exploit to serve the target... The documentation mentions United Rake, Peddle Cheap, Packet Wrench, and Beach Head—all delivered from a FOXACID subsystem called Ferret Cannon.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.