MalwareUsed by 1 actor

exeproxy

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Boyusec

With such access, the co-conspirators would typically install other tools on victim computers, including malware the co-conspirators referred to as “ups” and “exeproxy.”

via us department of justicejustice.gov

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

With such access, the co-conspirators would typically install other tools on victim computers, including malware the co-conspirators referred to as “ups” and “exeproxy.”

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

the co-conspirators would, for example, send spearphishing e-mails to employees of the targeted entities, which included malicious attachments or links to malware.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

the co-conspirators would, for example, send spearphishing e-mails to employees of the targeted entities, which included malicious attachments or links to malware.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

us department of justiceNews

Nov 27, 2017

Office of Public Affairs | U.S. Charges Three Chinese Hackers Who Work at Internet Security Firm for Hacking Three Corporations for Commercial Advantage | United States Department of Justice

Malware/tool reportedly deployed on victim systems following spearphishing compromise as part of persistent unauthorized access and data theft operations.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.