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Malware

Stoned bootkit

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence2

Windows bootkits gained notice in the early 2000s as proofs of concept developed by researchers of offensive security. BootRoot, a bootkit demonstrated at the 2005 Black Hat security conference, is likely the first such instance.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence2

Secure Boot checks the digital signatures of all code that loads during system startup to ensure it originates from a trusted provider... Secure Boot is designed to thwart bootkits, a form of malware that alters the systems responsible for loading firmware and software during the initial boot sequence.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

The 'Stoned' bootkit, an MBR rootkit presented by Austrian software developer Peter Kleissner... has been shown capable of tampering TrueCrypt's MBR, effectively bypassing TrueCrypt's full volume encryption.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence2

Windows bootkits gained notice in the early 2000s as proofs of concept developed by researchers of offensive security. BootRoot, a bootkit demonstrated at the 2005 Black Hat security conference, is likely the first such instance.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence2

Secure Boot checks the digital signatures of all code that loads during system startup to ensure it originates from a trusted provider... Secure Boot is designed to thwart bootkits, a form of malware that alters the systems responsible for loading firmware and software during the initial boot sequence.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.