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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Recipe Lister

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL-CRI-1089

Operations attributed to CL-CRI-1089 also include Recipe Lister and Calendaromatic, both of which fall under a broader designation known as TamperedChef (aka EvilAI), an ongoing series of campaigns that involve using trojanized versions of productivity software to deliver potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) and adware.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1
TacticResource Development

These campaigns distribute malicious Google and YouTube advertisements using a network of Google-verified shell companies, with the ads acting as a lure to trick targets into deploying malware that masquerades as legitimate desktop applications.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

TamperedChef (aka EvilAI), an ongoing series of campaigns that involve using trojanized versions of productivity software to deliver potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) and adware.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1
TacticCommand and Control

What makes FlutterShell noteworthy is that it implements a WebView-based architecture that utilizes a JavaScript-to-native bridge, thereby allowing the adversary to host malicious logic on an external website, rather than embedding it into the binary.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.